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1. Introduction 
According  to conventional  wisdom,  inflation can only be reduced at the 
cost of a short-term contraction in economic  activity. Available evidence 
for industrial  countries  has  been  taken  to support  the  notion  that dis- 
inflation  is contractionary  (Gordon,  1982). The costs  of disinflation  are 
generally  attributed to the presence  of nominal  contracts (Fischer, 1977; 
Taylor, 1980) and are thus expected  to hold for open economies  (Fischer, 
1986). The last  15 years,  however,  have  witnessed  the  emergence  of a 
large body of evidence  on the real effects of stabilization in high-inflation 
countries  which  clearly defies  this conventional  view. 
The  first  clear  indication  that  there  was  something  missing  in  the 
traditional understanding  of disinflation came from the stabilization pro- 
grams  in  the  Southern  Cone  of  Latin America  (Argentina,  Chile,  and 
Uruguay)  in  the  late  1970s.  In spite  of a very  large real exchange-rate 
appreciation,  economic  activity expanded  rapidly in the first years after 
stabilization.  The contraction typically associated with inflation stabiliza- 
tion came only later in the programs. An examination of similar episodes 
in chronic inflation countries  clearly suggests  a common  pattern (Kiguel 
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and Liviatan,  1992; Vegh  1992): countries  that use  the exchange  rate as 
the  nominal  anchor  in  inflation  stabilization  programs  experience  a 
boom  in  economic  activity  (consumption,  investment,  and  GDP  ex- 
pand),  a large  real exchange-rate  appreciation,  a rise in  the  real wage 
rate, and a deterioration  in the external accounts.  Later in the programs, 
these  effects  are often  reversed,  with  the economy  contracting  sharply 
and the real exchange  rate depreciating. 
A large literature has  sought  to explain these  intriguing  phenomena. 
Early work by Rodriguez  (1982) and Dornbusch  (1982) on the Southern 
Cone programs of the late 1970s emphasized  the presence  of sticky infla- 
tion.  According  to this hypothesis,  under high capital mobility a reduc- 
tion in the rate of devaluation  leads to a fall in nominal interest rates and, 
given  sticky  inflation,  to a lower  real interest  rate. This fall in the real 
interest rate causes  an economic  boom.  An alternative explanation  is the 
"temporariness  hypothesis"  (Calvo, 1986; Calvo and Vegh,  1993), which 
focuses  on the effects of lack of credibility. This hypothesis  considers  the 
case in which  agents  expect the inflation stabilization program to be re- 
versed  in the future. If money  is needed  to carry out transactions,  a tem- 
porary reduction  in nominal  interest  rates lowers  the effective  price of 
consumption  today relative to the future and induces an initial consump- 
tion  and  output  boom  accompanied  by  an  appreciated  real exchange 
rate.  Several  authors  have  emphasized  the  role  of  fiscal  policy.  In 
Helpman  and Razin (1987), the reduction in the inflation tax generates  a 
wealth  effect, and thus a boom,  due to the lack of Ricardian equivalence. 
In Drazen  and Helpman  (1988), the wealth  effect comes  through  the ex- 
pectation  of a future  reduction  in government  spending.  Rebelo  (1994) 
considers  a scenario  in which,  in the  absence  of reforms,  government 
expenditure  increases,  thus  raising  the  present  value  of the  resources 
that the government  eventually  needs  to extract from the private sector 
through  taxation or other means  (nationalizations,  forced lending,  etc.). 
By bringing  the fiscal situation  under control, a stabilization produces  a 
wealth effect that can generate a boom, even though taxes increase in the 
short run. The role of durable-goods  consumption  has been  stressed  by 
De Gregorio,  Guidotti,  and Vegh  (1994). In their model,  consumers  fol- 
low  (S,s) rules  for the purchases  of durable goods.  Since transacting is 
costly,  a  fall in  inflation  frees  resources  for other  uses.  The  resulting 
wealth  effect induces  consumers  to bring forward purchases of durables, 
thus generating  an initial boom and a later slowdown.  Finally, the more 
recent  literature has  focused  on the supply-side  effects  that may result 
from removing  the inflationary distortion on labor supply  (Roldos,  1993) 
or capital accumulation  (Roldos,  1995; Uribe, 1995). 
While this large theoretical literature has provided  useful insights  into Real  Effects  of Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  *  127 
different aspects  of exchange-rate-based  stabilization,  there has been  no 
attempt  at tackling  the  different  hypotheses  within  a single  analytical 
framework  to assess  their relative importance.  Furthermore, a compari- 
son  of the quantitative  relevance  of the various  theoretical mechanisms 
in light  of the orders  of magnitude  observed  in practice is also lacking. 
The purpose  of this paper is thus to assess-both  qualitatively and quan- 
titatively-the  different  hypotheses  using  a unified  framework.  To this 
end,  we  develop  a  small  open  economy  model  characterized  by  two 
sectors of activity (tradables and nontradables),  physical capital accumu- 
lation,  a  transactions-based  demand  for  money,  and  an  endogenous 
supply  of labor. 
At a qualitative  level,  we  find that several hypotheses  perform fairly 
well  in a number  of dimensions,  although  no  single  hypothesis  seems 
capable  of accounting  for all empirical regularities.  The supply-side  ef- 
fects of disinflation  proved  to be an essential  component  of any scenario 
that comes  close to mimicking actual stabilization dynamics.  At a quanti- 
tative  level  we  find  it very  difficult  to  explain  the  magnitudes  of  the 
observed  real appreciations  and consumption  booms.  Hence,  improving 
the quantitative  performance  of this class of models  remains an impor- 
tant challenge  for future research in this area. 
The paper proceeds  as follows.  Section 2 reviews  the stylized  facts of 
exchange-rate-based  stabilization in chronic-inflation countries and illus- 
trates these  facts with data for four major stabilization episodes:  the 1978 
Uruguayan  tablita, the 1985 Israeli stabilization,  the 1987 Mexican stabili- 
zation,  and  the  1991  Argentine  convertibility  plan.  Section  3  uses  a 
model  with  exogenous  labor  supply,  which  abstracts from  money,  to 
isolate four basic mechanisms:  the wealth effect, the labor-supply  effect, 
the effective-price-of-consumption  effect, and the investment  effect. Sec- 
tion  4  extends  this  model  to  incorporate  endogenous  labor supply,  a 
transactions-based  demand  for money,  and  physical  capital accumula- 
tion  subject to adjustment  costs.  We calibrate the model  using  data for 
Argentina  and  solve  it numerically.  Section 5 proceeds  to examine  four 
hypotheses:  credible disinflation,  temporariness,  fiscal effects, and nomi- 
nal rigidities  (sticky wages  and sticky inflation).  Section 6 evaluates  the 
performance  of the different hypotheses  and discusses  the implications 
of several extensions  and modifications  of our baseline  model.  Section 7 
concludes. 
2.  Stylized  Facts  of Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilizations 
Since  the  late  1940s,  many  developing  countries  have  endured  long 
periods  of  chronic  inflation.  Chronic inflation  is characterized by  high 128 - REBELO  & VEGH 
(relative to industrial  countries)  and persistent  inflation.1 Unlike hyper- 
inflation-whose  duration  is  measured  in months  and  exhibits  an ex- 
plosive  nature-chronic  inflation  is  relatively  stable  and  may  last  for 
decades.  Countries  adapt  to living  with  high  inflation by creating vari- 
ous  indexation  mechanisms  in  financial,  labor,  and  goods  markets 
which,  by reducing  the  costs  of inflation,  tend  to perpetuate  the infla- 
tionary  process.  Thus,  as  stressed  by  Bruno  (1993), while  large  fiscal 
deficits  typically  constitute  the  "original sin" behind  chronic  inflation, 
accommodative  monetary  and  exchange  rate policies  and  widespread 
indexation  explain the adaptation  to "living in sin." 
Getting  rid of chronic inflation  has proved  to be a long  and arduous 
process.  More  often  than  not,  stabilization  attempts  have  failed  and 
inflation  has  come  back with  a vengeance.  During  the 1980s, however, 
some  countries-most  notably,  Chile,  Israel,  Mexico,  and,  more  re- 
cently, Argentina-have  succeeded  in drastically reducing  their rates of 
inflation. 
With a few  exceptions,  most  major stabilization  programs in chronic 
high-inflation  countries  have  used  the exchange  rate as the main nomi- 
nal anchor.  The choice  of the exchange  rate over a monetary  aggregate 
reflects  the  fact that  in  high-inflation  countries  velocity  is  likely  to be 
subject  to unpredictable  shifts-often  exacerbated by a high  degree  of 
dollarization-which  makes  it difficult  to  assess  the  rate of  monetary 
growth  consistent  with  a targeted  inflation  rate.  Moreover,  a pegged 
exchange  rate has the advantage  of allowing  for an endogenous  increase 
in the nominal  money  stock. 
During  the  past  30  years  there  have  been  13 major exchange-rate- 
based  stabilizations  in Argentina,  Brazil, Chile, Israel, Mexico, and Uru- 
guay. Roughly half of these programs were "heterodox" in the sense  that 
they  supplemented  the fixing of the exchange  rate with price and wage 
controls.  The  remaining  stabilization  plans  were  "orthodox,"  that  is, 
they  used  the  exchange  rate as the  sole  nominal  anchor. Whether  suc- 
cessful  or  not,  exchange-rate-based  stabilizations  in  chronic-inflation 
countries  have  been  characterized  by  a series  of  empirical regularities 
documented  in  Kiguel  and  Liviatan (1992), Vegh  (1992), and  Reinhart 
and Vegh  (1994). These  regularities,  listed below,  can be easily detected 
in Figures 1-4,  which  describe four major stabilization episodes:  the 1978 
Uruguayan  tablita, the 1985 Israeli stabilization,  the 1987 Mexican stabili- 
zation,  and the 1991 Argentine  convertibility plan. 
1. The  important  distinction  between  chronic  inflation  and  hyperinflation  goes  back to 
Pazos (1972). For recent analyses,  see Bruno (1993), Sachs (1987a), and Vegh (1992). Real  Effects  of Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  *  129 
i  i.11  ii1,  ,i  i 
Figure  1 ARGENTINA:  1991  CONVERTIBILITY  PLAN 
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Figure  2 ISRAEL:  JULY  1985  STABILIZATION  PLAN 
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Figure 3 MEXICO: 1987 STABILIZATION  PLAN 
.  Devaluation and Inflation  Real Private Consumption 
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Figure  4 URUGUAY:  OCTOBER  1978  STABILIZATION  PLAN 
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1.  Slow convergence  of the inflation  rate to the devaluation  rate. An exchange- 
rate anchor is often advocated on the basis that, through its immediate 
effect on inflation  of traded goods,  overall inflation will quickly con- 
verge  to  the  rate  of  devaluation.  However,  a  comparison  of  four- 
quarter changes  in the exchange rate and prices suggests  that inflation 
has  normally  converged  slowly,  particularly in  orthodox  programs 
(with the Southern Cone tablitas  being the most prominent example, as 
illustrated for the Uruguayan  1978 program in Figure 4). 
2.  An  initial expansion in economic activity followed by a later slowdown. 
Contrary to what  traditional Phillips-curve-type  relationships  would 
predict,  economic  activity (GDP, employment,  private consumption, 
and private investment)  has typically expanded  in the first stages  of 
the  programs.  The  increase  in  the  private  consumption  of  durable 
good  has been  particularly dramatic, as illustrated in Figures 2-4  for 
Israel,  Mexico,  and  Uruguay  (car sales).  In all the  plans  that failed, 
the  initial  boom  was  later followed  by  a severe  recession,  as  illus- 
trated in Figure 4 for the Uruguayan 1978 stabilization. This late reces- 
sion has also been observed  in some successful  programs, such as the 
Israeli stabilization.2 Although  not well  documented,  it also appears 
that output  in  the  nontradables  sector  typically  expanded  by  more 
than output  in the tradables sector, which  has even  fallen relative to 
trend.3 
3.  A rise in the relative price of nontraded  goods (real exchange-rate  apprecia- 
tion). As  Figures  1-4  illustrate,  the  increase  in  the  relative  price of 
nontraded  goods  has generally been  substantial.  In failed programs, 
the  relative  price  of  nontraded  goods  has  typically  followed  an 
inverted-U-shaped  path,  as illustrated in Figure 4 for the Uruguayan 
1978 program.4 
4.  An increase  in real wages measured  in units of tradable  goods. Real wages 
2. Using  panel  data for seven  high-inflation  countries  for the period  1964-1993,  Reinhart 
and Vegh  (1994) show  that GDP growth  is significantly above the mean growth  rate (by 
2.3%) in the  early  stages  of exchange-rate-based  stabilizations  and  significantly  lower 
(by 5.4%) in the late stages. 
3. In Israel, for example,  the tradable sector grew at the same rate as before the program, 
while  the  nontradable  sector  grew  considerably  more  (at an  annual  rate of  7.5% in 
1986-1987,  compared  to  2% per year  growth  in  1981-1986  (Bufman and  Leiderman, 
1995)).  In Uruguay,  nontradables  sectors  like  construction  and  retail grew  by  20 and 
22%, respectively,  in the first three years of the stabilization plan, while  manufacturing 
(a tradable sector) grew  by only 4.7% (Central Bank data). In the first two years of the 
Mexican  program,  some  tradable  sectors  contracted,  while  nontradable  sectors  typi- 
cally expanded. 
4. The relative price of nontradable  goods  is a trade-weighted  index using  CPIs computed 
by the  IMF For Israel the  relative price of nontradables  was  computed  using  the U.S. 
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have  typically  increased  in the initial stages.  The Uruguayan  experi- 
ence  seems  to be an exception  in this respect.5 
5.  An ambiguous  response  of real interest  rates. The behavior of (ex post) real 
interest rates appears to depend on whether the plans have been ortho- 
dox or heterodox. In orthodox plans realized real interest rates have typ- 
ically declined,  while in heterodox plans they have typically increased. 
6.  A remonetization  of the economy. The ratio of M1 to GDP has typically 
increased  rapidly in the aftermath of stabilization  plans  (Uruguay is 
an exception  in this respect). 
7.  A deterioration  of the trade and current account. The external accounts 
have  generally  deteriorated  sharply, reflecting a large increase in im- 
ports of durable goods  and capital goods. 
8.  A large  fiscal adjustment  (in successful  or temporarily  successful  programs). 
The  elimination  of  large  public-sector  deficits  is clearly a necessary 
condition  for  an  enduring  disinflation.  Programs  where  the  fiscal 
adjustment  has been either partial or absent (as in the Argentine  1978 
tablita, in  the  1985 austral  plan,  and  in  the  1986 Brazilian cruzado 
plan)  have  quickly  gotten  off track. In successful  programs  (or pro- 
grams that have lasted for several years,  like the Uruguayan  tablita), 
the public-sector  accounts  have  been  balanced  upon  or shortly after 
implementation  of the program, with  the 1985 Israeli plan (Figure 2) 
and 1991 Argentine  convertibility plan (Figure 1) being dramatic exam- 
ples.  Large fiscal adjustments  have taken place either through  major 
cuts in public expenditures  (as in Israel) or through increases in taxes. 
9.  A boom  in the real estate market.  The price of residential and commercial 
property tends to rise significantly in exchange-rate-based stabilization 
episodes.  In the  first two  years following  the implementation  of the 
Uruguayan  1978 stabilization plan, the prices of housing  and land (in 
dollar terms) rose by 181 and 212%, respectively (Roldos, 1991). Prices 
of housing  and land fell sharply in 1982 when  the program ended  and 
returned  to  their  prestabilization  levels.  During  the  Chilean  1978 
tablita,  real housing  prices increased by 135%  in the first three years of 
the  program  and  then  fell  precipitously  in  1982 to  prestabilization 
levels  when  the program was  abandoned  (Morande and Soto,  1992). 
3.  The  Basic  Mechanisms 
Before proceeding  with  a model  that contains  all the elements  we  want 
to  study,  we  use  a simpler  model  to isolate  the  key  economic  mecha- 
5. Due to data limitations,  the real-wage series reported in Figures 1-4  were deflated using 
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nisms  that will be present in most of the hypotheses  that we will discuss. 
This  section  describes  an optimizing  small open  economy  with  perfect 
international  capital  mobility.  In  this  economy  the  supply  of  labor is 
exogenous,  there is no physical  capital accumulation,  and money  plays 
no role.6 
3.1 THE  MODEL 
3.1.1  Preferences  The economy  is populated by a large number of identi- 
cal households.  The representative  household  seeks to maximize its life- 
time  utility  defined  over  sequences  of consumption  of  tradable goods 
(CT)  and nontradable  goods  (CNT): 
U  =  t  T 
{[ (CT)  NT  1  },  0  <  <  1  ,  (1) 
t=0  1-  1/cr 
where  0 <  ,B <  1 is the  discount  factor and  a  >  0 is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution.  Each agent supplies  inelastically N units of time 
per  period,  which  he  allocates  to  working  in  the  tradables  (Nt)  and 
nontradables  (NNT) sector: 
Nt  +  NTT = N.  (2) 
3.1.2  Production  Technology  This economy  has the production  structure 
of a specific-factors model  (Jones, 1971; Mussa,  1974). Labor is the mobile 
factor, and the specific factors are capital (K) and land (T). Production of 
tradables  (Yf) and  of  nontradables  (YtT) is described  by  the  following 
Cobb-Douglas  production functions,  where ZT  and ZNT  are time-invariant 
level parameters: 
YT  =  ZT(Nt)  aK  0 <  a <  1,  (3) 
yNT =ZNT(NtT)  71TT1-  0 <  r  <  1.  (4) 
The stock of land is fixed, and, for the purposes  of this section,  the stock 
of  capital  is  also  taken  as  constant.  Since  nontradables  are  labor- 
intensive,  we  assume  that a <  r7. 
6. See Frenkel  and Razin  (1987)  and the references  therein  for a discussion  of optimization- 
based open-economy  models. For  the recent  simulation-based  literature,  see the surveys 
by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995) and Baxter  (1995). The small open-economy 
framework  that we employ is most similar  to the models of Mendoza (1991),  Lundvik 
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3.1.3  The Household's Problem  To economize  on  notation,  we  assume 
that households  directly operate the economy's  technology  and sell their 
production  in the goods  market. Hence,  they face the following  budget 
constraint: 
Yt  +  ptYt  +  ft  +  btl(l  +  r)  =  (1  +  rr)Ct  +  (1  +  rT)ptCNT +  bt,  (5) 
where Pt  is the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables. House- 
holds can borrow and lend in the international capital market at the exoge- 
nous  real interest  rate r*. The variable bt represents  private net  foreign 
asset holdings.  The government  levies  taxes on the consumption  of both 
goods at a rate rt. To isolate the distorting effects of taxation, we assume in 
this section that the tax revenue is rebated to the households  in the form of 
lump-sum  transfers (lt).  The no-Ponzi-game  condition for the representa- 
tive household  is 
bt  lim  =  0.  (6)  t  (1 +  r*)t 
To abstract from the  presence  of trends  in the current account,  we  as- 
sume  that  13 =  (1  +  r*)-l.  The  household's  problem  then  consists  in 
maximizing  lifetime  utility, defined  in (1), subject to the constraints  (2)- 
(6). This  formulation  is equivalent  to one  in which  there are domestic 
factor markets  for capital,  labor,  and  land.  Firms in both  sectors  hire 
factors of production  in order to maximize  profits.  Households  choose 
their consumption  path in order to maximize lifetime utility. 
3.1.4  The Government  Budget Constraint  The government  collects  taxes 
on the consumption  of both goods  and rebates this revenue to the house- 
holds  through  lump-sum  transfers. Government  net foreign asset hold- 
ings  (ft) evolve  according to 
ft = ft-(1  + r*) +  TCT  +  7ptCt  -  ,t.  (7) 
The no-Ponzi-game  condition  for the government  is 
lim  =  0.  (8) 
t-o  (1  +  Yr*)t 
3.1.5  Equilibrium  in the Goods  Markets  We assume  that nontradables  are 
only  used  for consumption,  so  in equilibrium  the  sequence  of relative 
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yT  =  Ct  .  (9) 
Using  this equation  and aggregating  the private and public budget  con- 
straints,  we  obtain  the  equilibrium  conditions  for the  tradable goods 
market: 
Yf =  CT +  TB,,  (10) 
at =  (1 +  r*)at_,  + TB,,  (11) 
where  at =  bt + ft represents  the consolidated  net asset  holdings  of the 
government  and the private sector, while TBt  is the economy's  trade bal- 
ance. The current account is given by CAt = r*at  _  + TBt.  In the absence of 
shocks,  this economy  is always  at a steady  state where  TB =  -r*a.  Any 
level of a is consistent  with the steady state. Positive levels of net foreign 
asset holdings  allow the economy  to finance a trade deficit that makes it 
possible  to enjoy higher levels  of consumption  of both goods. 
3.2 FOUR  BASIC  EFFECTS 
Consider  now  the economic  mechanisms  at work in this model.  Under- 
standing  these  mechanisms  will make clear which  are the key elements 
that need  to be  combined  to reproduce  the  stylized  facts described  in 
Section  2.  The  qualitative  implications  of  the  first three  effects  on  the 
main variables of interest are summarized  in Table 1. 
3.2.1  The  Wealth Effect  The  stabilization  literature  often  refers  to 
"wealth  effects"  as being  important  in understanding  the outcomes  of 
stabilizations.  The  wealth  effect  in  the  Hicksian  sense  comprises  the 
responses  of  the  different  choice  variables  to  an  increase  in  lifetime 
utility  at unchanged  prices.7 In this economy,  a wealth  effect takes the 
form of a proportional  increase in the consumption  of both goods  with 
no change  in the labor allocation across the two sectors, as follows  from 
the optimality  conditions: 
1  y  CNT 
pt'qZ  r  (N)  r  -T'  aZT(N)lK1-'.  (13) 
Equation  (12) dictates  the  optimal  proportions  in which  tradables and 
nontradables  are consumed.  Equation (13) determines the optimal alloca- 
7. For a discussion  of wealth  and substitution  effects in dynamic models,  see King (1991). 138 *  REBELO  & VEGH 
Table  1  BASIC  EFFECTS 
Effect  in 
Shock  Period:a  yr  yNT  CT  CNT  NT  NNT  p  w  a 
Increase  1  1  T  T1  ,  1  t  t 
ina  oo  1  1  T  1'  1  T  1 
Increase  1  1  T  T  1  4  i  l  -b 
in N  oo  t  t  1'  --b 
Temporary  1  t  t  T  I1  t  t  t  b 
decline in 'F  t > 10  1  I  1I  4 
"Period  1 is the period  in which the shock  takes  place. 
bThe  symbol "-"  indicates  that the variable  remains  unchanged. 
tion of labor across the two sectors. These equations  show  that a propor- 
tional increase in the two productivity parameters ZT  and ZN in an econ- 
omy where a = 0 generates  a pure wealth effect: the consumption  of both 
goods  rises  in  the  same  proportion,  leaving  their  relative  price  un- 
changed. 
To illustrate the effects  of a shock that generates  a wealth  effect,  sup- 
pose  that there is an increase in the stock of net foreign assets  in period 
0. By increasing  a we  obtain a combination  of the Hicksian wealth  effect 
and  the  substitution  effects  that take place in equilibrium as a result of 
the  increase  in  p.  All  these  effects  take  place  immediately,  since  the 
model  displays  no  transition  dynamics.  An  increase  in a leads  house- 
holds  to expand  their consumption  of both goods.  Notice  that if p were 
unchanged,  households  would  maintain the same ratio CT/CNT.  This is, 
however,  infeasible.  Equation (13) shows  that when  p does  not change, 
the values  of NNT  and yNT remain the same.  In order for CN to expand,  p 
has  to  rise  to  induce  a  reallocation  of  labor  toward  the  nontradable 
sector. In equilibrium,  therefore,  p always  rises and the consumption  of 
tradable  goods  always  expands  by  more  than  the  consumption  of 
nontradables.8  The reallocation  of labor toward  the non-tradable  sector 
leads  to  a fall in  the  production  of  tradable goods.  The  trade balance 
deteriorates  as a result of the fall in yT and the rise in CT.  This fall in the 
trade balance  is compensated  by  the increase  in returns to net  foreign 
assets  (r*a). 
The  consistency  of  these  various  effects  with  prominent  features  of 
exchange-rate-based  stabilizations  explains  why  wealth  effects  are con- 
8. It is obvious  that the same increase in demand  that generates  a real appreciation  raises 
the rental price of land, which  in equilibrium is pt(l -  q7)ZN(NT)V  '-.  This is consistent, 
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sidered  important  in understanding  these  episodes.  A key issue  is thus 
what may be the source of wealth  effects in stabilization programs. 
3.2.2  The Labor-Supply  Effect  In a model with an endogenous  labor sup- 
ply  the  total amount  of time  devoted  to market activities will generally 
respond  to  the  stabilization  shocks.  The  effects  of  these  labor-supply 
movements  can  be  illustrated  in  this  simple  model  by  considering  an 
exogenous,  permanent  increase  in  the  total  supply  of  labor,  N.  This 
triggers both  a positive  wealth  effect and substitution  effects associated 
with  changes  in  the  relative  price  of nontradables.  To understand  the 
effects  of an increase  in N, suppose  for a moment  that the relative price 
of nontradables  remains  unchanged.  Given the assumption  that a  <  9q, 
NNT  will  increase  by  more  than  Nr.  For this  to be  an equilibrium,  the 
consumption  of nontradables  would  have  to increase by more than the 
consumption  of tradables.  However,  if p remains constant,  households 
will want to increase the consumption  of both goods  in the same propor- 
tion.  Thus,  in equilibrium  the relative price of nontradables  will have to 
fall.  This  implies  that  CNT  will  increase  by  more  than  Cr. The  current 
account remains unchanged  because  the increase in N is permanent.  We 
conclude  that an increase  in the labor supply  will help  explain the con- 
sumption  booms  but  will  make  it more  difficult  to rationalize  the  ob- 
served  increase in the relative price of nontradables. 
3.2.3  The Effective-Price-of-Consumption  Effect  Macroeconomic  stabiliza- 
tions  are generally  characterized by a decline  in the rate of inflation.  To 
the extent that money  is used to purchase consumption  goods,  the fall in 
inflation  lowers  the  effective  price  of consumption.  This effect  can be 
illustrated in this real model by considering  a reduction in the consump- 
tion  tax  rate,  since  it  produces  similar  effects  to  a  fall in  the  rate  of 
inflation.  Given that labor supply  is exogenous  and that the tax revenue 
is  rebated  to  the  households  in  a  lump-sum  manner,  a  permanent 
change  in  r  has  no  effects.  However,  temporary  changes  in  c are not 
neutral, because  they distort the relative price of consumption  today vis- 
a-vis consumption  in the future. This effect is the crux of the "temporari- 
ness" hypothesis  discussed  in Section 5. 
Denote  the  current period  by t, and suppose  that  c takes on a lower 
value  between  now  and period  t +  T, after which  it returns to its initial 
level.  Consumption  of  both  goods  will  be  higher  during  the  low-tax 
periods  and  lower  afterwards.  These  higher  levels  of consumption  are 
financed  by depleting  the  stock of net-foreign  assets,  i.e.  by running  a 
current account  deficit.  A rise in consumption  leads  to an increase  in p 
for the reasons  discussed  before: the relative price of home  goods  has to 140  REBELO & VEGH 
increase  in order to elicit the increase  in NN  that makes  the rise in CNT 
feasible.9  For T periods  we  will  observe  a  consumption  boom  and  a 
higher level  of p. The magnitude  of the consumption  boom  depends  on 
the  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution,  o-, and  on  the  production 
parameters  a and r1. 
What happens  from period t + T + 1 onward? The economy  looks just 
as it did  before  period  t, but  it has  a lower  level  of net foreign  assets. 
Thus both consumption  and p will be lower than before time t. 
It is worth noting  that this experiment  does not isolate the pure substi- 
tution  effect  associated  with  the  temporary  decline  in  r7. The  results 
reflect  a  mixture  of  this  substitution  effect  with  a  negative Hicksian 
wealth  effect.  To see  this,  recall that the  tax revenue  is rebated to the 
household,  so a constant consumption  tax rate has no effects on the level 
of  welfare.  By distorting  the  intertemporal  price  of  consumption,  the 
temporary  decline  in  : actually  lowers  the utility  of the  representative 
household. 
3.2.4  The  Investment  Effect  Before we move on to a more complex formu- 
lation,  it is worthwhile  to incorporate  investment  in physical  capital in 
this model  to discuss  the determinants  of the domestic  capital stock. To 
accomplish  this we only need to introduce three changes  into the model: 
include  investment  expenditures  (It) in the right-hand  side  of equation 
(5) and  in the market clearing condition  (10), and append  the standard 
capital accumulation  equation,  where  8 denotes  the rate of depreciation: 
Kt =  It +  (1  -  8)Kt1.  (14) 
This assumes  that investment  in physical  capital requires only  tradable 
goods.  Since investment  does  not involve  adjustment  costs,  the stock of 
capital adjusts  immediately  to equate  the world  real interest  rate to the 
domestic  marginal productivity  of capital, net of depreciation: 
r*=  (1  -  a)ZT(NT+  )  K-  5.  (15) 
This equation  shows  that investment  in physical  capital is affected by 
both direct and indirect forces.  An increase in the productivity  parame- 
ter ZT is the simplest  example  of a direct force that increases investment. 
A  decline  in  taxes  on  output  or  investment,  as  well  as  a  decline  in 
inflation  when  investment  transactions  require the  use  of money,  has 
9. The relative price p remains unchanged  only when  the two goods  are perfect substitutes 
(in this case CNT  does  not change)  or when  both production  functions  are linear in labor 
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effects  similar to those  of an increase in ZT. However,  investment  is also 
affected  by  changes  in  the  demand  for nontradables,  which,  through 
their effects on Nr, alter the desired  stock of capital. 
We have  seen  that both  a temporary  decline  in the effective  price of 
consumption  and an increase in net foreign assets generate consumption 
booms  and  real appreciations.  In both  cases  the  amount  of  labor em- 
ployed  in the tradables sector declines.  This will lead to a fall in invest- 
ment  that restores  the parity between  the domestic  net productivity  of 
capital and the international real interest rate. In order for investment  to 
rise,  this  indirect  effect  has  to be  compensated  by  a shock  that raises 
domestic  capital productivity. 
4.  A Monetary  Model with Capital  Accumulation 
This section  extends  our simple  model  to include  physical  capital accu- 
mulation  with  costs  of  adjustment,  a  transactions-based  demand  for 
money,  and an endogenous  labor supply. 
4.1 PREFERENCES 
To make the supply  of labor endogenous,  we adopt a two-good  version 
of the momentary  utility used  in Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  and Huffman 
(1988): 
U=  pt  1 
lt  1)(CT)  --  q(Nf  +  NNTyT) 1-  -1 
>  O,  v>  1,  >  0.  (16) 
In  small  open  economy  models,  such  as  those  of  Mendoza  (1991), 
Lundvik  (1992),  and  Correia,  Neves,  and  Rebelo  (1995),  this  form  of 
preferences  produces  more  realistic behavior  for consumption  and  for 
the  trade  balance  than  instantaneous  utility  functions  that  are Cobb- 
Douglas  in consumption  and leisure. 
4.2 PRODUCTION  TECHNOLOGY 
We maintain the same specific factors structure of Section 3, described by 
(3) and (4), but we no longer treat K as fixed. 
4.3 CAPITAL  ACCUMULATION  TECHNOLOGY 
Tradable goods  can be used  for consumption  or investment  (It). The law 
of motion  for the  capital stock features  adjustment  costs  to investment 
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Kt =  4(It/Kt_)Kt_1  +  (1  -  8)Kt,.  (17) 
The  parameter  0  <  8  <  1 denotes  the  rate  of  depreciation,  and  the 
function  b(.) is an increasing,  concave,  twice continuously  differentiable 
function  with  two  properties  that guarantee  the absence  of adjustment 
costs  in the  steady  state:  k(8) =  5, 4'(8)  =  1. This formulation  implies 
that Tobin's q, the ratio of the value of capital to its replacement  cost, is qt 
=  1/('(IJ/ Kt_), and is thus equal to one in the steady state. 
4.4 TRANSACTIONS  TECHNOLOGY 
Money  is  used  for  transactions  according  to  a  specification  in  which 
holdings  of  real  money  balances  expressed  in  terms  of  traded  goods 
allow  the  agent  to  economize  on  the  amount  of  resources  devoted  to 
transactions.  We denote  these  resources  by St and assume  that they are 
denominated  in terms of tradable goods:10 
St =  Z(Ct  +  I,)v(  C Mt/  (18) 
t  t 
where  PT is  the  nominal  price  of  traded  goods,  M/PT represents  real 
money  balances,  and Zs is a level parameter. Total consumption  defined 
in units of the tradable good is given by Ct = CT  + ptCN. We assume  that 
the  function  v( ? ) has  the  following  quadratic  form: 
v(X) =  X2 -  X + ?4,  (19) 
where  Xt = M/[PT(Ct +  It)] is the reciprocal of the velocity  of circulation 
with  respect  to total expenditure.  As will become  clear below,  this par- 
ticular quadratic form insures  that transactions costs  are zero when  the 
nominal  interest  rate is zero. 
4.5 THE  HOUSEHOLD'S  PROBLEM 
Households  maximize their utility described by (16) subject to the specifi- 
cation of the technology  (3),(4),(18),(19) and to the following  constraint: 
10. This type  of transaction  technology  has been  widely  used  in monetary  macro models; 
see,  e.g.,  Kimbrough  (1986) and Marshall (1992). The properties  of a monetary  econ- 
omy  in which  v(-) has  the  quadratic form used  in  (19) below  and  S represents  time 
devoted  to transactions  activities were analyzed  in Vegh (1989). Real  Effects  of Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  *  143 
Mt 
bt + Ct + ptCT + It +  St + 
b t 
pT  M-1 
= b,tl(l  +  r*) +  T  +  (1 -  T,)Yt  + pt(l  -  Tt)Y  +  f,  (20) 
t  Pt-i 
where  rt  is the tax levied on the output of both sectors, while  Qt is a lump- 
sum transfer from the government.  The borrowing and lending opportu- 
nities in the international  capital market remain the same as in Section 3. 
The no-Ponzi-game  condition  described  in (6) continues  to apply  here. 
We will also continue  to assume  that  3 =  (1 + r*)-. 
4.6 MONEY  DEMAND 
The  optimal  conditions  for the  household  problem,  together  with  the 
quadratic form assumed  for v( ? ), imply  that the  demand  for real bal- 
ances  is  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  total expenditures,  which  ac- 
cords with the estimates  of Reinhart and Vegh (1995): 
Mt  1(  1R 
t  (Ct + It) 2  1ZS(+  -)  (21) 
where  Rt denotes  the  nominal  interest  rate.  For simplicity  we  assume 
that tradables  inflation  in the country  to which  the currency is pegged 
(typically  the  United  States)  is  zero.  The nominal  interest  rate is  then 
given  by 
Rt =  (1 + Et)(1  +  r*) -1,  (22) 
where  Et is the rate of devaluation.  One useful  property of the quadratic 
transactions  technology  is  that it implies  a finite  demand  for real bal- 
ances  when  the  nominal  interest  rate is zero.  In this  case  the  optimal 
value of X is V2,  and transactions costs are nil [v(X) = 0]. Thus, when  Rt = 
0  the  equilibrium  of  our  economy  coincides  with  that  of  a model  in 
which  all goods  are "credit goods,"  so that money  plays no role. 
4.7 LABOR  SUPPLY 
The supply  of labor at each point in time is given by 
+  NT  =  y(1-  Y)l-  y)p-l( 
l  _  -)wt 
-  )  (23) 
Nvt(N1  + ZS1 -  X  (23) 
where  w  denotes  the  before-tax  real  wage  rate  defined  in  units  of 
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w=aZTK--l(Nt)  .  (24) 
As a result  of our preference  specification,  the supply  of labor behaves 
in  a  simple,  intuitive  fashion.  The  labor  supply  at  time  t is  solely  a 
function  of the  after-tax real wage  rate deflated  by the consumer  price 
index  ((1 -  T)  wt ptrl) and the expected  rate of inflation at time t (which 
determines  Xt). Thus there is no income effect or intertemporal substitu- 
tion  effect  driving  the  supply  of  labor. The  elasticity  of  labor supply 
with  respect to the real wage  is 1/(v -  1). 
4.8 THE  GOVERNMENT  BUDGET  CONSTRAINT 
The  government  collects  taxes  on  the  production  of both  goods,  buys 
tradables (GT)  and nontradables  (GN), and makes a lump-sum  transfer to 
the  households.  Government  net  foreign-asset  holdings  (ft) evolve  ac- 
cording to: 
Mt  PT  [1M 
ft = 
ft-l(1  +  r*)  + 
tt 
-- 
t-  t  +  +  tPtY  -  t  -  GT -  ptGNT.  (25) 
Pt  1  t-1 
The path  for ft has  to  satisfy  the  government  no-Ponzi-game  condition 
(8). In all the experiments  that we will study we compensate  changes  in 
seignorage,  tax  revenue,  or  government  expenditures  by  adjusting 
lump-sum  taxes or transfers. 
4.9 MONETARY  POLICY 
Since  we  are interested  in fixed-exchange-rate  regimes,  we  will  model 
the  rate of  devaluation  Et as  the  exogenous  policy  parameter  that  the 
government  controls.  The level  of Mt will be endogenously  determined 
by  the  money  demand  equation  (21) and  by  the  requirement  that the 
price  of  tradable  goods  be  the  same  in  the  two  countries:  pt  =  etPt, 
where  PT  is the  foreign  price of tradable goods  and e, is the  exchange 
rate. 
4.10 EQUILIBRIUM  IN THE  GOODS  MARKET 
Equilibrium in the nontradable  goods  market requires 
yNT =  CNT  +  GNT  (26) 
Using  this equation  and aggregating  the private and public budget  con- 
straints,  we  obtain  the  equilibrium  conditions  for the  tradable  goods 
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Yt = CT +  It +  St +  GT +  TBt,  (27) 
t =  (1 + r*)at_, + TBt.  (28) 
Here at = bt + ft represents,  as before, the consolidated  net asset holdings 
of the government  and of the private sector. TBt  is the economy's  trade 
balance. 
4.11 THE  STEADY  STATE 
Given that we abstracted from technological progress, all the variables de- 
fined above will be constant  in the steady state. The steady state for this 
economy  is defined  by a set of conditions  that include  the resource con- 
straints and equations  (12), (13), (21), (23), and (24). Conditions  (12) and 
(13) relate p to the labor allocations across the two sectors and to the con- 
sumption  mix. Conditions  (21), (23), and (24) are, respectively,  the equa- 
tions that describe money  demand,  labor supply, and the real wage rate. 
Since there are no adjustment costs in the steady state, the net marginal 
product of capital (adjusted for the transactions costs associated with the 
investment  process)  is equated  to the international real interest rate: 
(1  -  a)(1  -  T)ZT(  K N)-a ()  .  (29) 
1 +  ZS(  -  X2) 
Notice  that we recover the usual expression  that equates the domestic 
marginal product  of capital net of depreciation  to the world real interest 
rate when  the nominal interest rate is zero, since in this case X is equal to 
2 [see equation  (21)]. 
The steady-state  level  of investment  is given  by I =  8K. The steady- 
state trade balance is determined  by the condition 
TB =  -  r*a.  (30) 
As in Section 3, the steady state is consistent  with any level of net foreign 
assets."  Economies  with  higher levels  of a have higher steady-state  lev- 
els of consumption  of tradables and nontradables,  as well as lower levels 
of investment  and production  of tradable goods. 
4.12 CALIBRATING  THE  MODEL 
Our model has no known closed-form solution,  so we employ the numeri- 
cal linearization methods  of King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) to explore its 
11. For  high enough values of a, the steady state can be characterized  by a corner  solution 
in which NT is zero. Since in all the scenarios that we consider a is negative, this 
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Table  2  PARAMETER  VALUES 
Parameter  Baseline  Value 
International  real interest rate (r*)  0.01 
Discount factor  (p3)  0.99 
Rate of devaluation  (e)  0.46 
Depreciation  rate (8)  0.025 
Labor  share, tradables  sector (a)  0.48 
Labor  share, nontradables  sector (q1)  0.63 
Elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  (a)  0.20 
Elasticity parameter,  momentary  utility (v)  3.00 
Level parameter,  momentary  utility (rq)  22.75 
Share  parameter,  momentary  utility (y)  0.50 
Level parameter,  tradables  production  (ZT)  1.00 
Level parameter,  nontradables  production  (ZNT)  4.76 
Level parameter,  shopping technology (ZS)  1.00 
Level of net foreign assets (a)  -  6.81 
Adjustment  costs elasticity  (r)  0.067 
Government  expenditures  in tradables  (GT)  0.25 
Government  expenditures  in nontradables  (GN)  0.51 
Tax  rate on output (T)  0.10 
Note:  Each  period  is meant  to represent  one quarter. 
properties.12 Our baseline  parameters are described in Table 2. Each pe- 
riod is meant to represent a quarter. These parameters were chosen  to try 
to replicate the average values of some key ratios for the Argentine  econ- 
omy in the decade  prior to the 1991 convertibility plan. This is a difficult 
task, given the instability of the Argentine economy  during the 1980s. We 
nevertheless  chose Argentina as the reference country because the conver- 
tibility plan was orthodox,  i.e.,  it did not rely on price and wage controls. 
We  employed  the  point  estimates  of  the  elasticity  of  intertemporal 
substitution  obtained  by Reinhart and Vegh  (1995) for Argentina  (a  = 
0.2).  We followed  Uribe (1995) in setting  the rate of inflation to its aver- 
age value  in the  period  1970-1990:  10% per month.  We also employed 
his estimates  for the labor shares in the tradable and in the nontradable 
sector  (a  =  0.48  and  77 =  0.63).  The  share  parameter  in  the  utility  func- 
tion was  set equal to 0.5; together  with  our choices  for ZT  and ZNT, this 
implies  that approximately  half of total consumption  expenditures  are 
devoted  to nontradables.  We chose  v = 3, which  implies  an elasticity of 
labor supply  of 0.5,  so as to obtain realistic labor-supply  responses  (in- 
creases  in labor supply  on the order of 3%) in the experiments  that we 
12. This method  involves  linearizing  the model  around the steady  state. The fact that this 
model  displays  a unit  root (associated  with  the  ability to borrow and lend  at a fixed 
interest  rate) may  lower  the accuracy of the  numerical  approximations,  since  we  lin- 
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considered.  We chose  if =  22.75,  which  implies  that in the steady  state 
agents  devote  20% of their time to working  in both sectors. 
We chose  the  transactions  technology  parameter Zs to match  the  7% 
ratio of  seignorage  to  GDP  estimated  by  Kiguel  (1989) for the  period 
1984-87.13 The level of net foreign assets (a) was chosen  so as to generate 
a steady-state  trade balance relative to the GDP that coincides  with  the 
long-run  average  for this variable in the period  1970-1990  (0.0267). Tax 
revenue  during  the  period  1985-1987  was  10% of GDP, while  govern- 
ment  expenditures  for the nonfinancial  public sector (excluding  real in- 
terest payments)  represented  roughly  30% of GDP.14  We chose  r =  0.10 
and  set  the  overall  level  of  government  expenditures  consistent  with 
these  figures.  We assumed  that 70% of government  expenditures  were 
devoted  to nontradable  goods,  with  the remainder  spent  on tradables. 
The model  was parametrized with standard values for the real interest 
rate (1% per quarter) and for the rate of depreciation  (2.5% per quarter). 
We chose  adjustment  costs so that the elasticity of Tobin's q with respect 
to the  investment-capital  ratio [ -  4"(S)S/4'(8)] is equal to Vis, which  is 
Baxter and Crucini's (1993) baseline  parameter. 
In all  the  experiments  described  in  the  next  section,  we  follow  the 
literature in treating stabilizations  as unanticipated  events.  We start the 
economy  in period 0 at the steady state and assume  that the stabilization 
was  until  then  unanticipated,  but is perfectly  foreseen  from that point 
on. Throughout  the paper the results we report are expressed  in terms of 
percentage  deviations  from initial steady-state  values. 
4.13 MONEY-BASED  VERSUS  EXCHANGE-RATE-BASED 
STABILIZATION 
Before we proceed,  it is important to notice that in our model there is no 
difference  between  an exchange-rate-based  stabilization  and  a money- 
based  stabilization  (where  the  government  controls  the money  supply 
and the exchange  rate is endogenous).  Fixing the exchange rate implies a 
certain  path  for  M.  Any  money-based  stabilization  in  which  the 
government  adopts  the same path for Mt will produce the same outcome. 
In practice,  however,  exchange-rate-based  programs are preferred to 
money-based  programs  for two  reasons.'5  First, the velocity  of circula- 
13. Kiguel's  (1989) seignorage  estimates  were  computed  as the change  in M1 because  in 
Argentina  reserve  requirements  on  time deposits  and other interest-bearing  deposits 
were  remunerated  by  the  Central Bank. These  estimates  are broadly consistent  with 
the money  demand  function  estimated  by Rodriguez  (1994), which  implies  that a 10% 
monthly  inflation is consistent  with a ratio of seignorage  to GDP of 6%. 
14. The  source  for  these  figures  is  the  Argentine  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Fund  staff 
estimates. 
15. In Reinhart and Vegh's  (1994) data set, which comprises  7 countries and 17 stabilization 
plans from 1964 to the present,  there are 12 exchange-rate-based  stabilizations but only 
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tion shifts  so much  at the onset  of a stabilization episode  that it is diffi- 
cult for policymakers  to determine  what  the appropriate growth  rate of 
Mt should  be. Fixing the exchange  rate makes Mt endogenous  and avoids 
this problem.  A second  problem with money-based  stabilizations is that, 
if the government  wants,  for some reason,  to avoid a period of deflation, 
it has to announce  a permanent  decline  in the growth  rate of money,  at 
the  same  time  it engineers  a one-time  increase  in Mt.  This rise in Mt, 
which  is necessary  to accommodate  the rise in money  demand  produced 
by  the  decline  in  expected  inflation  without  a price fall, might  under- 
mine  the credibility of the disinflation  program. 
5.  The  Alternative  Theories 
The  stylized  facts  reviewed  in  Section  2  have  given  rise  to  a  large 
theoretical  literature.  In this  section  we  use  the  model  of Section  4 to 
examine  the  implications  of  the  different  theories  for all the  relevant 
macroeconomic  variables. This is an indispensable  task. The stabilization 
literature generally  focuses  on a few variables at a time,  either to insure 
analytical  tractability or to isolate  particular mechanisms  of interest.  To 
facilitate the comparison  between  the different hypotheses,  we summa- 
rize their qualitative implications in Table 3, which reports the direction of 
change  for the  different  variables  at the  end  of the  first year after the 
implementation  of the stabilization  for our benchmark parametrization. 
5.1 CREDIBLE  DISINFLATION:  SUPPLY-SIDE  EFFECTS 
A natural starting point  to study exchange-rate-based  stabilizations is to 
isolate  the  effect  of a credible,  permanent  reduction  in the devaluation 
rate e. The resulting  supply-side  effects have recently been  emphasized 
by Roldos  (1993, 1995) and Uribe (1995). In all the experiments  that we 
consider,  we  reduce  the rate of devaluation  by 100%. This is consistent 
with  the convertibility  plan,  where  the exchange  rate was fixed. 
The effects of a decline in the rate of devaluation  are depicted in Figure 
5.16  The decline  in the rate of inflation generates  the type of investment 
effect discussed  in Section 3. The fall in the nominal interest rate reduces 
the  transactions  costs  associated  with  investment,  which  increases  the 
marginal  productivity  of capital net of these  costs  [equation  (29) shows 
the  steady-state  version  of  this  effect].  As  a  result,  the  steady-state 
capital/labor ratio in the  tradable-goods  sector will be higher,  implying 
higher values  of w and p and a lower ratio CNT/CT.  There is also a wealth 
16. Roldos  (1995) derives  similar results in a cash-in-advance  model with exogenous  labor 
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Table  3  QUALITATIVE  EFFECTS 
yr  YNT  C  I  TB  N  w  p  M/PT 
Stylized facts  4  t  t  t  4  t  1  t  t 
Five hypotheses: 
Permanent  disinflation  t  t  1  1  t  t  t 
Temporariness  t  t  t  t  4  t  t 
Fiscal  contraction: 
Fall  in tradables 
expenditures  4  t  t  4  t  t  t  1  t 
Fall  in nontradables 
expenditures  t  I  t  t  4  T 
Rise in taxes  4  4  4  1  4 
Sticky  wages with 
supply-side effects of 
disinflation  t  t  T  1  T t 
Sticky  inflation  with 
supply-side effects of 
disinflation  t  t  t  t  t 
Note: This  table  summarizes  the  results  observed  in  the  fourth  quarter after  the  beginning  of  the 
stabilization.  These would  be the effects that one would  observe with annual data. 
effect produced  by the reduction  in resources  spent  transacting (S). On 
impact, the consumption  of both goods  increases.  Given the magnitudes 
involved,  the increase in labor supply  is not enough  to accommodate  the 
increase  in demand  for nontraded  goods.  Hence,  Nt falls and NNT rises 
on  impact.  The  rise in the  stock  of capital that takes  place  during  the 
transition is associated  with a fall in NNT and a rise in NT. 
5.2 THE  TEMPORARINESS  HYPOTHESIS 
A rich history of failed stabilization attempts in chronic-inflation countries 
typically leads the private sector to view with skepticism any new attempt 
to bring down  inflation to international levels.  This has been the motiva- 
tion underlying  the temporariness  hypothesis  explored by Calvo (1986) 
and Calvo and Vegh  (1993). This hypothesis  considers  the case in which 
the stabilization plan is not credible, and hence the reduction in the rate of 
inflation is viewed  as strictly temporary. Figure 6, which shows  the effects 
of a 100% decline  in the rate of devaluation  that only lasts for 10 periods, 
illustrates the implications  of the temporariness  hypothesis. 150  REBELO & VEGH 
Figure 5 PERMANENT 100% DECLINE IN THE RATE  OF DEVALUATION 
Rate  of Devaluation  Tradable  Output  Cons.  Tradables 
0  10  15 
-50  5  10 
-100  5 
-150  -5  0 
0  20  40  0  20  40  0  20  40 
time  time  time 
Cons. Non-Tradables  Nt,  Nnt 
time  time 
Investment 
Capital  Stock  Net Foreign  Assets 





0  20  40 
time 
Real  wage rate 
Real  Money  Balances 
0  20  40  0  20  40  0  20 
time  time  time 
All the effects are expressed  as percentage  deviations  from  the prestabilization  steady state. 
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Figure 6 TEMPORARY 100% DECLINE IN THE RATE OF DEVALUATION 
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Since money  must be used  to purchase  goods,  a temporary fall in the 
interest  rate lowers  the effective  price of consumption  today  relative to 
the  future-along  the  lines  discussed  in  Section  3-leading  to  a con- 
sumption  and output  boom  followed  by a later contraction.  The tempo- 
rarily lower  effective  price  of  consumption  induces  the  household  to 
increase  consumption  today  (i.e.,  between  period 1 and period  10) rela- 
tive to the future (i.e.,  after period  10). Thus, on impact both CT  and CNT 
rise.  The higher  levels  of consumption  observed  between  period  1 and 
period 10 are financed in part by a higher level of the labor supply  and in 
part by  a depletion  of net  foreign  assets.  Absent  the  increase  in labor 
supply,  we would  observe  (1) an increase in w due to the reallocation of 
labor from the  tradables  to the  nontradables  sector,  and  (2) a rise in p 
reflecting the higher demand  for nontradables.  These effects continue  to 
be present,  but the expansion  in the labor supply  is associated  with  an 
initial fall in the real wage  rate. The increase in N is primarily a result of 
the  fall in inflation,  which  lowers  the price of consumption  in terms of 
leisure  [recall  from  (23)  that  inflation  affects  labor  supply  through 
changes  in  X].  The  fall  in  inflation  makes  investment  temporarily 
cheaper.  This  causes  a large investment  boom  during  the  stabilization 
and a fall in investment  below  its initial level after period 10. 
5.3 THE  EFFECTS  OF FISCAL  POLICY 
The idea that some  of the effects of stabilization plans are a result of the 
fiscal reforms  that tend  to accompany  the  decision  to fix the exchange 
rate has been  stressed  in the work of Drazen and Helpman  (1988, 1990) 
and Agenor  (1994). One  puzzling  feature of stabilization  experiences  is 
that they seem  to be associated  with an economic  boom,  despite  the fact 
that  there  is  often  an  immediate  increase  in  taxes  and  a reduction  in 
government  expenditures.  The possibility  that fiscal contractions may be 
expansionary  has  been  explored  empirically  by  Giavazzi  and  Pagano 
(1990) in their analysis  of the fiscal contractions observed  in Ireland and 
Denmark in the 1980s. Recently, Rebelo (1994) has shown  that an expan- 
sion can occur in the presence  of an increase in taxes in situations where 
the present  value  of the resources  that the government  needs  to extract 
from the private sector declines  as a result of the stabilization plan. 
5.3.1  Fiscal  Adjustment  during Stabilization  Most successful  (or temporar- 
ily  successful)  stabilization  programs  typically  include  a  drastic  fiscal 
adjustment  that features a combination  of higher taxes and lower expen- 
ditures (see,  for example,  Sachs, 1987b). As an illustration, Table 4 docu- 
ments  the  nature  of  the  fiscal  adjustment  that  took  place  in  the  four 
stabilization  episodes  depicted  in Figures 1 through 4. In Argentina,  the Table 4  FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS DURING STABILIZATION 
Argentina (Public Sector Excluding Provinces)a 
% of GDP 
1989  1990  1991b  1992  1993 
1  Total revenues  13.7  13.8  15.8  17.1  17.4 
1.1 Tax revenue  8.6  8.4  10.0  11.7  11.3 
2  Expendituresc  30.7  16.6  18.3  17.3  16.7 
2.1 Interestd  11.8  3.3  2.6  1.5  1.1 
2.2 Wages  4.6  3.9  4.3  3.9  3.2 
3  Balance (1-2)  -  17.0  -  2.8  -  2.5  -  0.2  0.7 
Israel (General  Government)e 
% of GDP 
1984  1985b  1986  1987  1988  1989 
1  Total revenues  61.0  71.1  68.7  61.6  58.9  54.2 
1.1 Tax Revenue  37.1  44.4  46.8  45.3  44.1  39.1 
2  Expenditures  74.8  70.4  64.1  61.5  61.6  59.6 
2.1 Subsidies  6.3  4.8  3.1  3.1  3.4  3.0 
2.2 Defense  14.3  12.7  11.0  11.0  10.7  10.3 
3  Balance (1-2)  -13.8  0.7  4.6  0.1  -2.7  -5.4 
Mexico (Public Sector)f 
%  of GDP 
1986  1987b  1988  1989  1990  1991 
1  Total revenues  28.8  29.5  29.0  27.9  27.3  25.9 
1.1 Tax revenue  9.1  8.7  10.9  12.0  10.4  10.7 
2  Expenditures  43.7  43.9  39.9  32.9  30.1  26.5 
2.1 Interest  16.4  19.8  18.0  13.2  10.3  5.6 
2.2 Wages  5.8  5.6  6.1  5.8  5.7  6.3 
3  Balance (1-2)  -14.9  -14.4  -10.9  -5.0  -2.8  -0.6 
Uruguay (Central  Government)g 
%  of GDP 
1977  1978b  1979  1980  1981  1982 
1  Total revenues  15.0  14.2  14.6  16.2  17.4  15.2 
1.1 Tax revenue  11.2  10.9  10.1  11.8  12.3  10.6 
2  Expenditures  16.3  15.6  14.3  16.1  17.5  23.9 
2.1 Interest  1.0  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.6 
2.2 Wages  6.8  6.1  5.2  5.7  6.4  7.4 
2.3 Soc. Secur.  3.0  2.9  2.9  5.0  5.6  9.4 
3.  Balance (1-2)  -  1.3  -  1.4  0.3  0.1  -0.1  -  8.7 
aSource:  Argentine  Ministry of Finance and Fund staff estimates. 
bYear  in which  the stabilization  plan began. 
CExcluding  expenditures  for arrears clearance to pensioners,  suppliers,  and provincial governments. 
dOn an accrual basis. 
eSource:  Bank of Israel. 
fSource:  Banco de Mexico. 
gSource:  Central Bank of Uruguay. 154 *  REBELO  & VEGH 
fiscal improvement  from 1990 to 1993 took the form of higher  revenues 
(including  taxes). In Israel, the drastic fiscal improvement  of 18.4 percent- 
age  points  in  the  general  government  deficit  as  a percentage  of  GDP 
from 1984 to 1986 reflected  a decline  of roughly  10 percentage  points  in 
public expenditure  (primarily in defense  and subsidies)  and an increase 
in revenues.  Part of the increase  in revenues,  however,  seems  to have 
been  an endogenous  response  to the initial boom,  as evidenced  by the 
fact that revenues  as proportion  of GDP fell sharply with the 1988-1989 
recession.17 Mexico already had a large primary surplus  (close to 10% of 
GDP) by the time the stabilization  plan was  implemented  at the end  of 
1987. The large overall deficits in the first years of the program shown  in 
Table 4 are explained  by the large interest  payments  that resulted  from 
high  interest  rates.  In  Uruguay,  the  fiscal  adjustment  had  also  taken 
place before the program was implemented.  In 1982, the fiscal situation 
deteriorated  sharply  due  to a large increase  in expenditures  (related to 
social security and government  salaries). 
5.3.2  Simple Fiscal Experiments  We will  focus  on  three  simple  experi- 
ments that highlight  permanent  changes in fiscal policy that are common 
components  of stabilization packages: (1) a reduction in government  ex- 
penditures  on tradables: (2) a reduction  in government  expenditures  on 
nontradables;  and (3) an increase in taxes. The outcomes  of these experi- 
ments are reported in Figures 7 through 9. In these figures the solid lines 
correspond  to the effects of fiscal policy in isolation, while the dotted lines 
display  the  fiscal effects  combined  with  the permanent  disinflation  fea- 
tured in Figure 5. 
Since the economy  can borrow and lend at a fixed rate, a reduction  in 
government  expenditures  on tradables is equivalent  to the expansion  in 
a discussed  in  Section  3.  The  timing  of  government  expenditures  on 
tradable  goods  is  irrelevant  from the  standpoint  of the  private  sector; 
only  the  present  value  of these  expenditures  matters.  The solid  line in 
Figure 7 shows  the effect of a 6% reduction  in GT.  This implies  a fall in 
total  government  expenditures  on  the  order  of  2%. This  corresponds 
roughly  to  the  contraction  in  expenditures  for the  consolidated  public 
sector observed  in Argentina.  The model  predicts a consumption  boom, 
an expansion  in the nontradable  sector and a contraction in the tradable 
sector, a real appreciation,  and an increase in the real wage.  Investment 
falls, and the current account improves.  It is clear that, in isolation,  this 
type  of fiscal contraction  cannot  explain  the  stylized  facts of Section  2. 
17. The  relationship  between  fiscal  revenues  and  the  initial  consumption  boom  in 
exchange-rate-based  stabilizations  has been stressed  by Talvi (1994a). Real Effects  of Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  ? 155 
Figure 7 PERMANENT 6% DECLINE IN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES  ON 
TRADABLE GOODS 
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Figure 8 PERMANENT 3% DECLINE IN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES  ON 
NON-TRADABLE GOODS 
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Figure 9 PERMANENT 10% INCREASE IN THE OUTPUT TAX RATE 
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However,  if we  combine  the effects  of a contraction in GT  with  those  of 
a permanent  reduction  in the rate of devaluation,  we  obtain a scenario 
that comes  close  to what we  observe.  The two effects combined  imply a 
12% rise  in  consumption  of  tradables  and  an  8% increase  in  home- 
goods  consumption.  The real exchange  rate appreciates  by roughly  4% 
on impact.  The rise in p attributable solely  to the fiscal contraction is on 
the order of 1%. 
Figure 8 shows  the effect of a permanent  decline  of 3% in GNT,  which 
represents  a 2% fall in total government  spending.  The response  of the 
economy  to a reduction  in  GNT  is  similar to that induced  by  the  labor- 
supply  effect discussed  in Section 3. After all, the fall in GNT  increases the 
supply  of labor available to the private sector. Thus we observe a fall in p 
and  in w. When  we  combine  this  fiscal contraction  with  the  effects  of 
disinflation,  we  obtain a scenario that fits in qualitative terms the main 
stylized  facts.  A  large  contraction  in  GNT  would,  however,  overwhelm 
the effects  of disinflation  and produce  counterfactual  implications.  It is 
unfortunate  that  the  fiscal  impacts  depend  so  heavily  on  the  type  of 
expenditures  that  is  reduced,  since  this  complicates  considerably  the 
interpretation  of the evidence. 
Figure 9 shows  the  effects  of an increase  in the output  tax rate from 
10% to 11%. This is roughly  consistent  with the tax increases  associated 
with  the  convertibility  plan  (e.g.,  the  VAT rate increased  from  14% to 
16% in 1991, and then increased again to 18% in 1992). Not surprisingly, 
the increase in taxes generates  a recession,  as well as other effects which 
are the  opposite  of what  we  observe  in the  initial stages  of exchange- 
rate-based  stabilizations.  However,  mild  tax increases  combined  with 
permanent  disinflation  can still generate realistic scenarios. 
5.4 STICKY  INFLATION  AND NOMINAL  WAGE  RIGIDITY 
The earliest explanations  for the empirical regularities described  in Sec- 
tion 2-put  forward by Rodriguez  (1982) and Dornbusch  (1982)-were 
based  on  reduced-form  models  which  incorporate  backward-looking 
elements  into  the  inflationary  process  (i.e.,  adaptive  expectations  or 
backward-looking  indexation  of  nominal  wages).  In  these  models, 
which  were  motivated  by the  Southern  Cone  tablitas of the  late  1970s, 
interest-rate  parity is assumed  to hold,  and aggregate  demand  depends 
negatively  on  the  real interest  rate and positively  on the real exchange 
rate (the  relative  price  of  traded  goods).  In this  context,  a permanent 
reduction  in  the  rate  of  devaluation  reduces  the  real interest  rate on 
impact and generates  a boom  in economic  activity. The stickiness  in the 
inflation  of home  goods  causes  a sustained  real exchange-rate  apprecia- 
tion,  which  eventually  throws  the  economy  into  a recession.  This hy- Real  Effects  of Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  ?  159 
pothesis  lost  some  practical relevance  in  the  mid-1980s  when,  unlike 
what  had  been  observed  in  the  Southern-Cone  tablitas, real  interest 
rates rose sharply in the early stages of the plan. 
From an analytical point of view, the explanatory power of sticky wages 
and sticky inflation  has recently been  called into question  by Calvo and 
Vegh  (1994), who  argue,  in the context  of an intertemporal  optimizing 
model,  that the initial fall in real interest rate will be associated  with  an 
initial boom  only  in the  (empirically implausible)  case in which  the in- 
tertemporal elasticity of substitution is higher than the intratemporal elas- 
ticity of substitution.  Sticky inflation, however,  continues  to be a popular 
notion  for thinking  about  stabilization,  as recently  illustrated by Dorn- 
busch  and Werner's (1994) study  of the Mexican 1987 stabilization. 
We now  examine  the merits of two hypotheses  that embody  nominal 
rigidities  in the  context  of our benchmark  model.  Instead of specifying 
nominal  contracts or lags in the adjustment  of prices, we  fed in realistic 
paths  for real wages  or for the real exchange  rate that converge  to their 
long-run  equilibrium  values.  This  seems  a natural first step  in  that  it 
allows us to determine  whether,  given some unspecified  nominal rigidity 
that generates  the required price behavior,  the model  is consistent  with 
the empirical regularities observed  for real variables. If nominal rigidities 
survive  as a useful  hypothesis,  the problem of uncovering  the source of 
sustained  disequilibrium rises in wages and prices becomes pertinent. We 
first consider  the  effects  of a permanent  disinflation  together  with  an 
increase in the real wage  that depends  on an exogenous  component  and 
on the level of employment  relative to the steady state. Then we study the 
impact of sticky inflation by analyzing  the effects of a disinflation  that is 
accompanied  by an exogenous  rise in the price of nontradables. 
5.4.1  Nominal-Wage  Rigidities  A common  explanation  for the  outcome 
of an exchange-rate-based  stabilization  program is that nominal  wages 
are indexed  to past inflation.  The materialization of low rates of inflation 
after the reform makes the real wage  too high.  To study the implications 
of this hypothesis,  we  compute  the perfect-foresight  equilibrium of our 
base  model  that corresponds  to a sustained,  but temporary, increase in 
the real wage  rate. Since the real wage is above its equilibrium value, we 
assume  that the number of hours hired in the labor market is determined 
by the short side of the market, which  in this case is the demand  side.18 
Thus  there  will  be  involuntary  unemployment:  the  number  of  hours 
18. Cho and Cooley  (1995) and King (1995) are examples  of dynamic  models  that embody 
nominal  rigidities  and  disequilibrium  allocation  rules.  Erceg and  Levin  (1994) have 
recently  discussed  the  role of nominal  rigidities  in stabilization  episodes  in a frame- 
work similar to the one we employ  here. 160 *  REBELO & VEGH 
employed  by firms will fall short of the total number of hours available in 
the economy.  We assumed  that real wages  follow  the process  given  by 
Wt =  t  +  vNt 
where wit  is the percentage deviation in the wage rate relative to the steady 
state,  't  is a wage shock, and vis the sensitivity of changes in the wage rate 
to variations in the total employment  Nt, defined as the percentage devia- 
tion  of Nt  +  N,T  from its steady-state  value.  The term vNt captures  the 
notion  that the real wage  rises as labor-market conditions  tighten.  In the 
results  that we  report we  set v =  1. We studied  the effects  of a hump- 
shaped increase in the wage shock  t with a peak value of 12%. This corre- 
sponds  to half of the 24% increase in the real wage,  measured  in units of 
tradable goods,  observed  in Argentina.  The resulting real wage is always 
above  its  equilibrium  value  but  converges  to its long-run  equilibrium. 
The effects of nominal-wage  rigidities considered  in isolation generate 
strongly  counterfactual  features: a recession  in both  sectors,  and a de- 
cline in both consumption  and investment.  Firms fire workers because of 
the  high  wages,  and  unemployment  leads  to a drop  in  consumption. 
Investment  falls in reaction to the low  returns to capital implied  by the 
high cost of labor. 
However,  much to our surprise, we found that nominal-wage  rigidities 
combined  with  the  supply-side  effects  of a permanent  reduction  in the 
rate of devaluation  produce  a realistic scenario (see Figure 10). 
5.4.2  Sticky  Inflation  We now consider the effects of a permanent reduc- 
tion in the rate of devaluation,  which leads to the instantaneous  conver- 
gence  of  tradables  inflation  but  to a slow  convergence  in home-goods 
inflation.  This setting,  in which  the price of one of the goods  is sticky, is 
similar to the one studied  in Stockman and Ohanian (1993). Specifically, 
we  assume  that  in  response  to  a permanent  reduction  in  the  rate of 
devaluation,  the path of p follows  the inverted-U  pattern depicted  in the 
first panel of Figure 11. We chose  the peak value of p to be 18%, which is 
half of the  rise in the real exchange  rate observed  in Argentina  during 
the convertibility  plan.  Since p is higher  than its market-clearing value, 
the  consumers'  demand  for nontraded  goods  falls  short  of  the  firms' 
desired  supply  [i.e.,  equilibrium  condition  (26) does  not  hold].  We as- 
sume  that the  short side  of the market prevails,  in the sense  that firms 
will only  supply  what consumers  demand. 
In isolation,  a rise in p increases  the  consumption  of tradable goods 
and  lowers  nontradable  consumption,  it raises  investment  (which  re- 
sponds  to the reallocation of labor toward tradables) and lowers  the real Real Effects  of Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  * 161 
Figure 10 PERMANENT DECLINE IN THE RATE  OF DEVALUATION WITH 
NOMINAL  WAGE RIGIDITIES 
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Figure 11 PERMANENT DECLINE IN THE RATE OF DEVALUATION WITH 
STICKY  INFLATION 
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wage  rate,  at the  same  time  that it deteriorates  the  current account.19 
Figure 11 shows  the combination of these effects with a permanent reduc- 
tion in the rate of devaluation.  This scenario is broadly consistent  with 
the facts discussed  in Section 2. 
6.  Evaluating  the  Different  Hypotheses 
6.1 QUALITATIVE  PERFORMANCE 
Both a temporary and a permanent  decline in the rate of devaluation  are 
capable of reproducing  most of the stylized  facts described in Section 2. 
Our version  of the temporariness  hypothesis  has, however,  an implausi- 
ble implication: investment  increases by 75% on impact. This unrealistic 
investment  response  can be eliminated  by increasing  the degree  of ad- 
justment  costs.  This leads  to a smaller deterioration  of the  current ac- 
count and to a smaller real appreciation,  but has a relatively minor effect 
on the behavior  of the other variables depicted  in Figure 6. 
None  of  the  three  simple  fiscal  experiments  that  we  consider-a 
permanent  decline  in  GT or GNT  and  a permanent  increase  in  the  tax 
rate-can,  in isolation,  produce  the main effects of exchange-rate-based 
stabilizations.  However,  mild  fiscal contractions  combined  with  the  ef- 
fects of disinflation  can produce  realistic scenarios.  The most promising 
of  these  scenarios  combines  a contraction  in  government  tradable ex- 
penditures  with a permanent  disinflation. 
Nominal-wage  rigidity by itself produces a recession with strong coun- 
terfactual features.  However,  the effects of nominal-wage  rigidities com- 
bined  with  those  of disinflation  are consistent  with most of our stylized 
facts. The same holds  for sticky inflation. 
Unfortunately,  the  ability of the different  hypotheses  to replicate the 
empirical  regularities  differs  most  with  respect  to  the  two  least-doc- 
umented  facts: (1) a recession  (or at least no boom) in the tradables sector; 
and  (2) a boom-recession  cycle observed  even  in successful  programs. 
Both a temporary  and a permanent  decline  in the rate of devaluation 
are incapable  of  producing  a visible  recession  in  the  tradables  sector, 
unless  they  are  combined  with  a  fiscal  contraction.  The  sticky-wage 
hypothesis  leads  naturally to a decline  in tradables production.  In con- 
trast, the sticky-inflation  hypothesis  tends to predict an expansion  in the 
tradables sector after the first quarter. 
19. The fact that p is temporarily high leads to a depletion  of net foreign assets.  Since the 
long-run  level of p depends  on a (see Section 3), we had to construct Figure 11 using an 
iterative procedure.  This method  insures that p returns to a long-run equilibrium that is 
consistent  with the level of a that is observed  at the end of the period during which p is 
above its equilibrium level. 164 *  REBELO  & VEGH 
There  are  three  hypotheses  that  generate  a  boom-recession  cycle: 
temporariness,  sticky  wages,  and  sticky  inflation.  In  our  versions  of 
sticky wages  and sticky prices,  however,  the recession  comes  too early: 
after a one-quarter  expansion  there is a decline  in investment,  employ- 
ment,  and the production  of nontradables. 
6.2 QUANTITATIVE  ISSUES 
The evolution  of some of the key macroeconomic variables is described in 
Table 5 for the four countries  that we considered.  This table makes clear 
that all our simulations  underpredict the consumption  booms observed in 
practice. This is partly due to the inclusion  of durables purchases  in the 
data reported in Table 5. However,  the consumption  booms predicted by 
our model are still smaller than the ones observed in nondurable consump- 
tion in the two countries for which we have disaggregated  data for dura- 
bles and nondurables-Mexico  and Israel. It is important to stress that in 
our experiment  the fall in seignorage  was compensated  by a rise in lump- 
sum taxes. When the total amount of resources extracted from the private 
sector falls one to one with the decline in seignorage,  the wealth effect of 
disinflation  is much  stronger and the model  generates  larger consump- 
tion booms.  In this case,  the model  comes  close to replicating the rise in 
nondurable  consumption  in Mexico  (15% from 1987 to  1991), but falls 
short of predicting the staggering 44%  boom in nondurables consumption 
observed  in Israel between  1985 and 1990. 
The most  important  quantitative  shortcoming  of our model  is that it 
produces  real  appreciations  that  are much  smaller  than  the  ones  ob- 
served.  The difficulties  involved  in accounting  for the real appreciation 
can be demonstrated  using  equation  (13), which  requires that the value 
of a marginal unit of labor be identical in the two  sectors.  Suppose  that 
labor is equally distributed between  the two sectors (Nt = NNT = 0.5) and 
that a =  qr = 0.5. To simplify, assume  also that the level of capital is fixed 
and that the supply  of labor is exogenous.  Under these assumptions,  the 
change  in the  relative price of nontradables,  Pt, coincides  with  the per- 
centage  increase  in the hours  of work devoted  to the nontradables  sec- 
tor. To explain  the 60% appreciation  observed  in Mexico over the period 
from 1987 to 1994, NNT  would  have  to have increased  (at the expense  of 
employment  in  the  tradables  sector) by  an implausible  60%.20  We can 
20. When  both  sectors  use  capital and labor, as in the models  of Rebelo (1993) and Uribe 
(1995),  it is even  more  difficult  to generate  large increases  in Pt. In that setting,  Pt is 
proportional  to (KTI/NT)-,  where  7 and a are the labor shares in the tradables and the 
nontradables  sectors,  respectively.  Since empirically reasonably values  for r  -  a are in 
the  range of 0.1 to 0.4,  large increases  in Pt require very large changes  in the capital- 
labor ratio of the tradables sector. Table 5  MAJOR STABILIZATIONS: CHANGES  IN SELECTED VARIABLES 
Relative  Trade 
Price of  Real  Private  Private  Real  Employ-  Deficit 
Non-tradables  Wage  Consumption  Investment  GDP  ment  (% of 
Programs  Effect  (% increase)  (% increase)  (% increase)  (% increase)  (% increase)  (% increase)  GDP) 
Argentina,  After 1 year  17.6  1.7  15.7a  11.6  8.9  4.2  2.8 
1991:2-1994:2  From beg.  to peak  36.3  2.9  37.6a  133.7  33.0  7.1  6. 1 
Israel,  After 1 year  10.9  -  2.4  14.1  -  0.2  3.6  1.4  -  3.5 
1985:3-1990:2  From beg.  to peak  16.6  15.4  37.3  33.1  21.4  10.5  0.7 
Mexico,  After 1 year  24.3  -  2.0  2.1  8.8  1.2  0.0  5.0 
1988:1-1992:4  From beg.  to peak  57.3  26.3  27.3  69.3  16.6  2.2  11.4 
Uruguay,  After 1 year  14.5  -  9.6  5.4  43.1  6.2  1.4  4.7 
1978:4-1982:3  From beg.  to peak  78.8  -  7.8  17.2  71.3  14.7  7.4  5.5 
Source:  IFS  and National  Authorities. 
Notes:  The period  chosen comprises  the quarters  in which the program  was in effect.  If a program  started  late in a quarter,  the following  quarter  is taken  as the first  quarter. 
For  Israel  and Mexico,  duration  has been arbitrarily  set to 5 years. For  Argentina  end of period  reflects  data availability.  Changes were computed from  beginning of the 
program to highest  value during  period  (lowest  value  for the trade balance). 
aThe  data  reported  correspond  to total consumption  instead of private  consumption. 166 *  REBELO  & VEGH 
reduce  the magnitude  of this labor reallocation if we  adopt  smaller val- 
ues  of  a  and  7R.  These  values,  however,  may be inconsistent  with  the 
share  of  labor in income  in  the  overall  economy.  In order to generate 
large  movements  in  Pt while  maintaining  empirically  reasonable  labor 
shares  and avoiding  implausible  labor reallocations,  we  need  to modify 
the  technology  in  order  to  steepen  the  marginal  cost  schedule  for 
nontradables  production. 
6.3 EXTENSIONS  OF THE  MODEL 
We explored  several extensions  of the model that improve on the results 
discussed  in the previous  section.  We also studied  modifications  of the 
model  that  significantly  deteriorated  its performance.  We now  discuss 
briefly both successes  and failures. 
First, if we  modify  the model  to make the marginal cost of producing 
nontradables  increase  more  steeply  with  YNT,  we  will obtain larger real 
appreciations  and lower consumption  booms.  The simplest modification 
along  these  lines  involves  a reduction  in  the  elasticity  of  substitution 
between  labor and  land  in  the  nontradables  sector.  An  interesting  ex- 
treme case is obtained when  we assume  that there is a fixed endowment 
of nontradables  that cannot  be  increased.  Such  modifications  produce 
large appreciations  only if we assume  that the intratemporal substitution 
between  Cr and CNT  is low. Otherwise,  these changes in technology  have 
a small effect on p and a large effect on the response  of CNT. 
Second,  if we  assume  that investment  requires  the  use  of tradables 
and  nontradables,  we  obtain  larger rises  in p. Once  again,  to produce 
large increases  in p we  need  to assume  that substitution  between  these 
two goods  is low both  in consumption  and in the investment  process.  It is 
obvious  that the presence  of substitutability in either of the activities will 
dampen  the rise in the price and magnify  the quantity adjustment. 
Third, we  incorporated  a form of preferences  widely  used  in the dy- 
namic macroeconomics  literature: 
U=i:  T  NT  p  T  NT 
E  --ti  {[(CT)  (CNT)  y  (1  _NT-Nt)1- 
T 
-  y]1-1/-}, 
t=o  1-1/o 
o  <  YT  <  1, o  <  NT <  1, o  <  P <  1, o >  o. 
In  this  version  of  the  model  the  supply  of  labor  exhibited  a  coun- 
terfactual  decline  in  many  of  our experiments.  This is  not  surprising, 
since the same wealth  effect that leads agents  to expand their consump- 
tion  leads,  with  preferences  of  this  type,  to an increase  in leisure.  In Real  Effects  of Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  *  167 
many  of  our  experiments  the  substitution  effect  associated  with  the 
wage  increase  was  not  powerful  enough  to  offset  the  positive  wealth 
effect on leisure.  It is the absence of a wealth  effect on leisure implied by 
the  preferences  in  Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  and  Huffman  (1988) that 
allowed  our  model  to be  consistent  with  the  observed  increase  in  the 
supply  of labor. 
Fourth, we considered  a version of the model where  S (the cost associ- 
ated  with  transactions)  represented  time  instead  of  resources.  This 
meant  that  the  disinflation  process,  by  reducing  S, produced  a strong 
labor-supply  effect of the type discussed  in Section 3.2.2,  thereby damp- 
ening  the increase in p that the model  generated. 
Finally, we studied  a version of the model in which investment  transac- 
tions did not require the use of money. In this case a reduction in the rate 
of devaluation  (both temporary and permanent)  still leads to an increase 
in investment,  as a result of an increase in the labor supply, which leads 
to a rise in NT. However,  this effect is quantitatively very small. The only 
hypothesis  that  produces  a  sizable  investment  increase  when  invest- 
ment  is a "credit good"  is sticky inflation.  In this case the rise in p can 
lead  to a reallocation  of labor toward  tradables that is large enough  to 
produce  a sizable investment  rise. 
7. Conclusions 
The empirical evidence  on the outcomes  of exchange-rate-based  stabiliza- 
tions defies  the conventional  wisdom  that inflation stabilization needs  to 
be painful.  Using  a dynamic  model  with  rational agents  who  have per- 
fect foresight,  we  have  found  that the following  hypotheses  work well 
on  a number  of dimensions:  (1) a credible,  permanent  reduction  in the 
rate of devaluation,  (2) a reduction in the rate of devaluation  believed  to 
be strictly temporary, (3) a fiscal contraction that reduces tradables expen- 
ditures,  combined  with  a reduction  in  inflation,  and  (4) a permanent 
disinflation  in the presence  of nominal-wage  rigidities or sticky inflation. 
Unfortunately,  the performance  of these  different scenarios  is most  dis- 
tinct with  regard  to the  two  facts about which  we  know  the least: the 
presence  of a recession  in the tradables sector and of a boom-recession 
cycle  even  in  successful  programs.  A recession  in the  tradables  sector 
arises naturally in an economy  with  sticky wages.  In order to produce  a 
fall  in  tradables  production,  both  the  temporary  and  the  permanent 
reduction  in the rate of devaluation  need  to be combined  with  a sizable 
fiscal contraction.  The only hypotheses  that generate  a boom-recession 
cycle are temporariness  and sticky wages  or prices. 
It is  important  to  stress  that  the  supply-side  effects  of  disinflation 168 *  REBELO  & VEGH 
proved  to be an essential  component  in accounting  for the stylized  facts 
of  exchange-rate-based  stabilizations.  This is particularly true with  re- 
spect to the nominal-wage  rigidity hypothesis.  When considered  in isola- 
tion this hypothesis  produces  strongly  counterfactual results,  but when 
combined  with the supply-side  effects of disinflation, it generates a realis- 
tic scenario. 
At a quantitative level  the results  for our baseline  parametrization fall 
short  of  explaining  the  orders  of  magnitude  involved  in  stabilization 
episodes,  suggesting  that the large consumption  booms  and the sizable 
real appreciations  are puzzling.  While  there  are configurations  of  the 
technology  that are consistent  with  the magnitudes  present in the data, 
there  is currently  not  enough  information  on  the  role played  by  non- 
tradable goods  in actual economies  to assess  whether  these  configura- 
tions are empirically plausible.  Improving our understanding  of the role 
of nontradables  in actual economies  is a natural goal for future research. 
Another  research direction that seems  fruitful is to improve  the treat- 
ment  of  the  way  in which  agents  form expectations  and  to model  the 
evolution  of  credibility  over  time.  In all our  results  we  made  use  of 
extreme assumptions:  policy reforms were either perfectly anticipated or 
totally unforeseen,  reform was either perfectly credible or doomed  to fail 
with  certainty.  Going  beyond  these  stark assumptions  is  likely  to  en- 
hance our understanding  of stabilization episodes.21 
From a  policy  perspective,  a better  understanding  of  the  dynamics 
involved  in bringing down  inflation from high levels seems  essential.  As 
recent  events  in  Mexico  vividly  illustrate,  some  of  the  dynamics  un- 
leashed  by  an  exchange-rate-based  stabilization  (in particular, the  real 
appreciation  and the current-account deterioration) may pose  a difficult 
policy  dilemma  as  to whether  corrective  measures  are needed  or not. 
Similar issues  have  also come up in the context of transition economies 
(Bruno,  1993; and  Hansson  and  Sachs,  1994). While structural changes 
are likely  to  create  additional  uncertainty,  the  main  lessons  from  the 
experience  of  high-inflation  developing  countries  should  prove  quite 
helpful  in designing  effective  stabilization policies for such countries. 
Appendix 
This appendix  describes  the main features of the four major stabilization 
plans described  in Figures 1-4. 
21. Baxter (1985), Kaminski (1993), and Svensson  (1990) discuss  methods  for estimating  the 
probability of reform continuation.  These estimates  can be used  to improve the model- 
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A.1 ARGENTINA:  APRIL  1991  CONVERTIBILITY  PLAN 
Date of stabilization  plan: April 1991 to the present. 
Exchange-rate/monetary  policy: The convertibility  plan was  a shock ortho- 
dox  program.  The  exchange  rate was  fixed,  and  the  monetary  base 
was,  by law, fully backed by gold and foreign reserves. 
Fiscal policy: During  the program,  the overall deficit of the public sector 
was basically eliminated.  The plan also included a massive privatization 
program. 
Structural policies: The  main  structural  change  has  probably  been  the 
dramatic reform of the public sector, which  included  the privatization 
of some  large public enterprises.  Financial markets have been  essen- 
tially free since the plan began. 
Wage and price indexation: During  the  plan,  formal  indexation  to  past 
inflation was  prohibited. 
A.2 ISRAEL:  1985  STABILIZATION  PLAN 
Date of stabilization  plan: Implemented  in July 1985.22 
Exchange-rate/monetary  policy: The plan was  an heterodox  one  which  in- 
cluded  a  freeze  of  the  exchange  rate and  wage  and  price  controls. 
Initially (first six months),  there were  also ceilings  on banking  credit 
enforced  through  higher  reserve requirements  and short-term capital 
controls. 
Fiscal policy: Drastic fiscal reforms were  used  to balance  the budget  al- 
most  overnight.  The  key  component  was  about  a 10% reduction  in 
public domestic  expenditure  (half of this reduction reflected a decline 
in defense  expenditure,  and the rest was achieved by cuts in subsidies 
of various  kinds).  The fiscal correction actually started in September 
1984 and was  further strengthened  in July 1985. 
Structural  policies:  In comparison  with other programs, structural policies 
were rather limited and gradual. The greatest changes  appear to be in 
financial markets,  which  were  substantially  deregulated  over the pe- 
riod 1985-1991.  Basically no progress was made on privatization. 
Wage and price indexation: Price and  wage  indexation  was  rampant  in 
Israel up to the  1985 plan,  which  justified in the eyes  of policymakers 
the  use  of wage  and  price controls  in the  1985 program.  Unions  are 
very  powerful  in Israel, and  a social pact was  viewed  as a necessary 
condition  to break the inflationary inertia resulting from indexation  to 
past inflation. 
22. See  Bruno  (1993) and  Bufman  and  Leiderman  (1995) for detailed  discussions  of this 
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A.3 MEXICO:  DECEMBER  1987  STABILIZATION  PLAN 
Dates of stabilization  plan: A major (heterodox,  a la Israel) plan was intro- 
duced  in December  1987.23 
Exchange-rate/monetary  policy:  The exchange was fixed for a year, and then 
devalued  according to a constant daily amount. Then, an exchange-rate 
band was implemented. 
Fiscal policy:  Major fiscal reforms were undertaken in the years preceding 
the  disinflation  plan.  Reforms  included  major  cuts  in  government 
spending,  tax reforms to increase  the tax base and collect taxes more 
efficiently,  and  privatization  of  state-owned  enterprises.  During  the 
program,  the  operational  deficit  was  high  due  to the  service  of  the 
public debt  (real interest  rates were  quite high) but there was  a large 
primary surplus  from the very beginning. 
Structural policies: A large number  of important structural changes  took 
place during the 1980s and early 1990s, with many taking place before 
the  plan.  Both  the  number  of  public  enterprises  and  public-sector 
employment  were  dramatically  reduced  over  the  period  1982-1992. 
Trade liberalization also took place, with the average tariff falling from 
27% in  1982 to  13% in  1992,  a process  which  culminated  with  the 
signing  of NAFTA. Mexico was  virtually cut off world  financial mar- 
kets up to 1989, when  voluntary  lending  resumed. 
Wage  and price  indexation:  Indexation to past inflation was widespread.  As 
in Israel, there was a pacto  social to reduce inflation. The pacto  has been 
renewed  regularly. 
A.4 URUGUAY:  OCTOBER  1978  STABILIZATION  PLAN 
Dates of stabilization  plan: Implemented  in October 1978, by preannounc- 
ing  the exchange  rate 90 days  in advance.  Ended in November  1982, 
when  the central bank was  forced to let the exchange  rate float, and 
the currency depreciated  by 140%.24 
Exchange-rate/monetary  policy: Preannounced  and declining  rate of deval- 
uation.  There was  no  attempt  at targeting  monetary  aggregates,  be- 
cause the high degree  of capital mobility made this infeasible. 
Fiscal policy: The  public  sector  was  in balance  by  1979. There were  no 
major fiscal measures  during the tablita, except for a tax reform in late 
1979,  whose  aim  was  to  make  the  system  more  efficient.  The  large 
increase in the fiscal deficit in 1982 was related to an increase in social 
security  payments  and government  salaries, and a reduction  in labor 
taxes. 
23. See Dornbusch  and Werner (1994) and Santaella and Vela (1994) for a discussion. 
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Structural  policies:  A  timetable  for  trade  liberalization  was  introduced  in 
1978.  The  trade  liberalization  proceeded  gradually  and  was  inter- 
rupted  in  1983. 
Wage  and  price  indexation:  During  the  tablita,  semiannual  public-sector 
wage  increases  and  social  security  benefits  were  de  facto  indexed  to 
past  inflation. 
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Comment 
MARIANNE  BAXTER 
University  of Virginia  and  NBER 
1. Introduction 
The original title of this paper was  "Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations: 
Theory and Evidence."  In many ways,  my comments  will be directed at 
encouraging  the  authors  to push  this  work  further in  the  direction  in 
which  I think they originally intended  to go-that  is, in the direction of 
providing  empirical evidence  on the adequacy of alternative theories. 
To begin,  I want  to say that I enthusiastically  endorse  the basic idea 
behind  this  project.  Even if one  is relatively far from this field in one's 
own  research,  as I have become  in recent years, it would  be difficult not 
to  notice  the  proliferation  of  theories  designed  to  explain  aspects  of 
monetary  stabilization policies in less-developed  economies.  In fact, one 
gets  the uneasy  feeling  that there may be more theories  than there are 
historical stabilization  episodes-an  undesirable  state of affairs from an 
econometric  point  of view.  To make matters worse,  most  of these  theo- 
ries  depend  in  a central  way  on  individuals'  expectations  concerning 
government  behavior  in  the  aftermath  of the  reform.  For this  reason, 
testing  these  theories  will be a subtle matter. 
Rebelo and Vegh  (RV) propose  a kind of "horse race"-they  propose 
to study  the quantitative  implications  of alternative hypotheses  within  a 
common  framework.  By doing  so, they hope  to be able to shed  light on 
which  theories perform well when  confronted with data on a wide range 
of economic  variables.  For example,  if a particular theory was  designed 
to explain  a post-reform  consumption  boom  and real exchange-rate  ap- 
preciation,  RV will also examine the predictions of the theory for output, 
investment,  the  current  account,  etc.  These  predictions  will  then  be 
compared  with  a set of "stylized facts" developed  from examination  of a 
group  of recent  stabilization  attempts.  In this way,  I think the authors 
hoped  to accomplish  two things.  First, this exercise should  cut down  on 
the number of theories  that will be allowed  to participate in future horse 
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races. Second,  by conducting  a quantitative exercise,  I think the authors 
hope  to set a new  standard for "success" in constructing  theories  of the 
effects  of  stabilization  policy.  My  view  is  that both  of  these  goals  are 
worthy  ones,  and a paper such as the one by RV is long overdue. 
Having  said  all  of  that,  I am  going  to  be  somewhat  critical of  the 
particular way in which  RV have chosen  to conduct this investigation.  In 
the remainder  of this  discussion,  I will address  two  issues.  First, I will 
discuss  aspects  of the model  structure chosen  by RV, and the extent  to 
which I think we can trust its answers  concerning the predicted effects of 
monetary  reforms. This will necessarily  involve  evaluation  of the plausi- 
bility  of  some  of  the  central  mechanisms.  My  second  goal  will  be  to 
discuss  ways  in which  I think RV can make their analysis more informa- 
tive about the mechanisms  through which particular sequences  of policy 
actions can lead to the effects we observe  in the data. 
2. Model  Structure 
In any investigation  of this kind,  there is an inevitable  tension  between 
keeping  the  model  simple  enough  so that the key mechanisms  remain 
transparent,  and  making  the  model  look  realistic,  which  of course  in- 
volves  additional  complexity.  In an exercise  such  as this one,  in which 
we  will  use  the  model  to  evaluate  the  success  of  specific  theories  in 
explaining  a set of stylized  facts for a number of essentially  similar coun- 
tries, my view  is that the balance should  be tipped more in the direction 
of realism than might be the case in a more abstract exercise. 
2.1 PRODUCTION 
The production  of traded goods  uses capital and labor, while the produc- 
tion  of nontraded  goods  uses  land  and labor. Labor is the only  mobile 
factor, and is instantaneously  and costlessly  mobile across sectors.  Fur- 
ther,  the traded  good produced  by this economy is identical to the traded  good 
produced  by the rest of the world. Why is this the natural benchmark struc- 
ture for production?  Rebelo and Vegh  do not tell us.  In particular, they 
do  not  tell us  enough  about the  structure of output  and trade in these 
economies  for us  to be able to evaluate  whether  the particular specific- 
factors model  they have chosen  may be adequate for the job at hand.  In 
some  recent work,  Kouparitsas (1994) has assembled  information on the 
output  and trade patterns for less-developed  and developed  economies. 
He  documents  the  fact that less-developed  countries  have  exports  that 
are highly  concentrated  in primary goods  and agriculture. The imports 
of  developed  countries  are concentrated  in manufactured  goods,  both 
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A recent paper by Roland-Hoist,  Reinert, and Shiells (1993) reinforces 
the notion  that industrial structure differs importantly between  develop- 
ing  countries  and  their  trading  partners,  in  ways  that  may  be  very 
important  for the purpose  of the RV paper. Their figures show  that, for 
Mexico,  32% of  gross  output  in  primary  goods  and  mining  were  ex- 
ported;  the  figures  are 17% in  manufactures,  and  zero  in services.  As 
regards  imports,  13% of Mexican  demand  for agriculture and  primary 
products  is satisfied  via imported  goods;  the figure is 37% in manufac- 
tures,  and  again,  zero percent  in services.  However,  although  services 
themselves  are nontraded,  these  are likely to be importantly affected by 
international  trade.  For example,  transport and  communication  is one 
major category  of  services,  and  over  half  of  the  Mexican  demand  for 
transport equipment  is satisfied  by imports,  about half of which  comes 
from the United  States. 
It bears noting,  as well,  that labor shares are not necessarily indicative 
of factor intensities.  In my examination  of durables in the United States 
(Baxter 1994), I found that the durable-goods  industries had a larger labor 
share than nondurables,  but that this was  due to a higher wage  rate in 
durables.  In  fact,  the  capital-labor  ratios  in  the  two  industries  were 
roughly  the same.  Another issue  concerning  the modeling  of labor input 
is the assumption  of frictionless  labor mobility across sectors in the RV 
paper.  Different  sectors  presumably  require different  skills,  and in any 
case it takes time to search for and find a new job in a different sector. An 
undesirable  implication of frictionless labor mobility is that it tends to lead 
to negative  correlation  of investment  across  sectors-this  effect can be 
seen  in some  of RV's experiments.  Kouparitsas (1994) found  that it was 
necessary  to introduce  small, convex costs of adjustment in labor as well 
as  in  capital  to  generate  positive  comovement  in  factor inputs  across 
sectors. Finally, his work also suggests  that intermediate goods are central 
for understanding  the business-cycle  links between developing  and devel- 
oped  countries. 
A low-cost  alternative to the Kouparitsas model is the two-good,  two- 
country  model  used  by Backus,  Kehoe,  and Kydland  (1992) and many 
others.  Each country  produces  a distinct  good,  which  may be used  for 
consumption  or investment.  This model has, in many ways,  become  the 
"standard" in  open-economy  dynamic  macroeconomic  analysis,  and  it 
would  be useful  to know  how that model fared in explaining the stylized 
facts of exchange-rate-based  stabilizations. 
2.2 UTILITY  FUNCTION 
Consumers  value  traded and nontraded  goods-however,  both of these 
goods  are nondurable  when  used  for consumption.  This is unfortunate, Comment 177 
because  one  of  the  important  "stylized  facts" of  these  reforms  is  the 
sharp increase  in the purchase  of consumer  durables,  which  to a large 
extent are imported.  In fact, some  of the theories  reviewed  by RV, such 
as the  one  by DeGregorio,  Guidotti,  and Vegh  (1994), stress  consumer 
durables as one important link in the economy's  response  to the stabiliza- 
tion policy. 
In the conference  draft of the paper, individuals  did not value leisure. 
That is, there was a fixed aggregate  supply  of time available for working 
and "shopping."  In the present  draft, the aggregate amount  of time de- 
voted  to market work can be varied,  which  I think represents  a definite 
improvement.  It is interesting  to note that the form of preferences  com- 
monly used in open-economy  dynamic macroeconomics  (the utility func- 
tion is given  at the end  of Section  6) leads  to a counterfactual decline in 
aggregate  labor supply  in  response  to wealth-increasing  reforms.  The 
reason  is that the wealth  effect of the reform leads to a decline  in labor 
input that outweighs  the substitution  effect of the higher wages.  For this 
reason, RV use a specification previously  used by Greenwood,  Hercovitz, 
and Huffman  (1988). This specification has the feature that there are zero 
wealth  effects  on  labor supply,  as well  as zero effects  of intertemporal 
substitution  on labor supply. This allows them to generate an increase in 
aggregate  labor supply  following  the reform. However,  they do not pro- 
vide a convincing  case that this modified utility function is something  that 
is consistent  with  the available empirical evidence  on consumption  and 
labor supply. 
2.3 THE  SHOPPING-TIME  MODEL  OF MONEY 
The shopping-time  model  is designed  to capture the idea that a larger 
stock of real balances  reduces  the real cost of consumption  by reducing 
time lost to inefficient  economic  organization-my  understanding  is that 
the "shopping  time" parable is not to be taken absolutely  literally. But I 
think there's an important question  whether  this model does adequately 
capture  the  real effects  of inflation  in economies  such  as  those  under 
study. It seems  to me at least as plausible-or  even more plausible-that 
high  and  variable inflation  does  not just disrupt  the consumption  pro- 
cess.  Rather, I think  it must  disrupt  the production  process  at least  as 
seriously.  This view  suggests  that the real money  stock should  perhaps 
be an argument  of the production  function.  In fact, I think RV's results 
are strongly  suggesting  that this is what the data require. For example, 
to get an increase in labor supplied  to production,  a decrease in inflation 
is needed  in order to reduce shopping  time and thus release labor to the 
production  process.  Further, RV note in several places that their model 
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inflation  to disrupt  the investment  process.  Are we  supposed  to believe 
that  firms  hold  cash  for  13 weeks  in  order to  rent  capital in  the  next 
quarter? Even  in these  very  high-inflation  environments?  Even  in that 
case,  however,  their  specification  does  not  allow  inflation  to  directly 
affect the productivity  of existing  capital, which  it would  if money  were 
just  in  the  production  function  in  the  first place.1 This  modification, 
along with  modifications  of the production  structure I suggested  earlier, 
should  make it easier to explain the post-reform investment  boom. 
3.  Timing  Issues 
I think there's an important question  concerning  the extent to which  the 
effects  of  the  exchange-rate-based  reforms  (ERBRs) are  due  to  the 
monetary  factors versus  fiscal factors. In Argentina,  the fiscal situation 
was  brought  under  control  about  a  year  before  the  ERBR; the  fiscal 
adjustment  looks  roughly  contemporaneous  with  ERBR in  Israel,  and 
follows  the ERBR  in Mexico. If we look at RV's Figure 1, which has time- 
series plots for Argentina,  we see that the real private consumption  boom 
began  at  the  time  of  the  fiscal  reform,  i.e.,  before  the  exchange-rate 
stabilization began. Further, the increase in the relative price of nontraded 
goods jumps after the fiscal reform but before the exchange-rate reform- 
its  subsequent  increase  is  rather  modest.  Is  the  boom  in  private 
consumption  due  to  a positive  wealth  effect  associated  with  reduced 
government  purchases?  Or is it an attempt  to find a store of value  in a 
near-hyperinflationary  period? 
In Israel, the  fiscal and exhange-rate  reforms take place contempora- 
neously,  and  the  effects  of  the  reform coincide  with  the  beginning  of 
the  reform  period.  In Mexico,  the  consumption  boom  starts with  the 
exchange-rate  reform,  but investment  does  not really take off until the 
economy  is  once  again  able  to  obtain  external  financing  (in  1989), by 
which  time the fiscal deficit has shrunk to a third of its level at the time 
of  the  exchange-rate  reform.  My  reading  of  this  evidence  is  that  the 
fiscal  aspects  of  the  reforms  may  be  more  important  for real activity 
than the reduction  of inflation. 
4.  How  Could  We  Find  Out? 
Rebelo  and  Vegh  are well  positioned  to help  us  explore  the  extent  to 
which  fiscal  versus  exchange-rate  reforms  are  important  for  the  re- 
sponses  to  these  policy  "packages."  Actually,  they  can  do  something 
1. The disruptive  effects of inflation on market organization have been the subject of recent 
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even  more informative  than this.  They can use  their model  to simulate 
the effects of the sequence  of policy changes  undertaken in the countries 
under  study.  For example,  a "stochastic  simulation"  of  the  Argentine 
reform would  proceed  as follows.  The calibrated model  would  be fed a 
sequence  of shocks  chosen  to mimic  the key  features  of the Argentine 
reform.  Specifically,  this  would  involve  first reducing  the  government 
deficit  through  spending  cuts  followed  by tax increases.  Subsequently, 
the exchange-rate  reform would  be undertaken.  By studying  the predic- 
tions  of the model  for this first experiment,  we  can gauge  the extent  of 
the relative importance  of fiscal versus  monetary  reforms in explaining 
the Argentine  experiences.  We can also learn about the extent to which 
the  model  can  explain  the  magnitude  of the  observed  responses-the 
paper  as  it  stands  does  not  give  us  nearly  enough  information  about 
magnitudes.  With regard to the Mexican experience,  the stochastic simu- 
lation would  involve  initial exchange-rate  stabilization policies,  followed 
by  fiscal adjustment  and  a reopening  to international  capital markets. 
Now,  RV acknowledge  that  many  of  the  theories  of  the  effects  of 
stabilization  policy  incorporate  expectations  in a nontrivial way. For ex- 
ample,  Rebelo's  (1994) story (cited in RV) about the expansionary  effects 
of fiscal reforms assumes  that individuals  view  current tax increases  as 
signaling  lower  future  taxes,  with  a lower  overall present  value  of tax 
receipts.  Why  not show  us the "Rebelo experiment" within  the context 
of this model? 
5.  Conclusion 
Let me end  by saying,  once  again,  that I admire the ambition of Rebelo 
and Vegh,  and that these comments  were intended  to encourage them to 
push  harder  along  this  line  of  research.  In  this  regard,  I think  they 
should  look at two very recent studies  that are essentially  case studies  of 
a particular country  conducted  within  a quantitative equilibrium frame- 
work.  The first is a study  of the recent reforms in Ghana undertaken  by 
Pattillo (1994)-the  puzzle  there is the failure of investment  to rise in the 
postreform  period.  The second  study is by Ihrig (1994). Her paper stud- 
ies the repatriation decision  of a multinational  firm in a setting in which 
capital controls are sometimes  imposed  by the repatriating country. Her 
study  focuses  on  Brazil, which  has  a history  of  occasionally  blocking 
repatriation of funds.  I think it's relevant in the present  context because 
Ihrig had to struggle  with  the problem of specifying  the multinationals' 
beliefs concerning  future capital controls in a way that is consistent  with 
the  operation  of  the  Brazilian economy.  If Rebelo  and  Vegh  can show 
that their approach provides  a powerful  tool for distinguishing  between 180 *  SACHS 
various  theories  of  exchange-rate-based  reforms-and  I  think  they 
can-they  will  succeed  in  setting  a new  standard  for theoretical  and 
empirical work in this area. 
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issues  facing many governments  is the appropriate exchange-rate  policy 
in the course  of disinflation.  Many governments  battling high  inflation 
have  attempted  to use  the exchange  rate as a nominal  anchor to bring 
about rapid price stability. Other countries have relied on tight monetary 
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countries  have  experienced  an  output  and  consumption  boom  in  the 
immediate  aftermath of an ERBS. 
There  are several  crucial questions  about  the  merits  of  ERBS. First, 
ERBS has shown  itself to be capable of producing  a sudden  end of high 
inflation,  especially  when  starting  from  hyperinflation.  What  is  the 
source  of this  sudden  disinflation?  Is it credibility, as suggested  in the 
seminal  paper  of Sargent (1982), or is it something  else? Second,  ERBS 
has often been able to produce disinflation with a smaller drop in output 
than a money-based  stabilization  (MBS). What is the source of the less- 
costly  disinflation?  Third,  and  more  mysteriously,  many  episodes  of 
ERBS  have not only avoided  a contraction, but have actually been accom- 
panied  by a boom,  in both  output  and  consumption.  Why  does  ERBS 
sometimes  contribute  to boom  conditions?  Fourth, following  the boom, 
some  episodes  of ERBS have  been  followed  by a bust in later years.  A 
cliche,  which  vastly  exaggerates  the generality  of experience,  holds  that 
ERBS is "boom first, bust  later," while  MBS is "bust first, boom  later." 
Even though  such  precise  regularity does  not exist,  what  could explain 
the boom-bust  pattern in many  cases  of ERBS?  Fifth, and finally, what 
have  we  learned  about  smoothing  the  output  effects  of  stabilization, 
both in the boom  and in the bust phases? 
Rebelo and Vegh's  paper addresses  mainly the third item: the sources 
of boom  in ERBS episodes.  I would  like to comment  briefly on all five 
points,  to give  some  broader perspective  to the important issues  raised 
in the paper. 
2.  Why  Does  ERBS  Achieve  Sudden  Disinflation? 
Certainly the most  surprising  single aspect of ERBS is that it has proven 
capable of stopping  hyperinflation  almost  immediately,  a point  first fa- 
mously  made by Sargent. Sargent attributed this suddenness  to the rees- 
tablishment  of  a credible  intertemporal  macroeconomic  policy,  mainly 
fiscal discipline  and central bank independence.  It is now clear, however, 
that disinflation can be achieved suddenly  even when credibility is not yet 
firmly established  (as indicated,  for example,  by a continuing  huge  dis- 
count  in  the  forward  market for foreign  exchange,  and  accompanying 
very high nominal  interest rates, even  after disinflation). 
The real answer to immediate  disinflation seems  to be that countries in 
high  inflation  become  increasingly  "dollarized" in price and wage  set- 
ting,  in that domestic  residents  use an external unit of account (particu- 
larly the dollar in the recent years, but sometimes  the deutsche  mark) for 
the  unit  of  account,  even  though  they  continue  to  use  the  domestic 
currency  for payments.  Thus,  domestic  prices  are set  as  dollar prices 182  SACHS 
multiplied  by the spot exchange  rate between  the domestic  currency and 
the dollar. Stopping  the exchange  depreciation  is tantamount  to ending 
domestic  inflation  (and  "importing" the  dollar inflation  rate). We also 
know  that exchange-rate  stability can be achieved  in the short term (i.e., 
temporarily) by the defense  of the currency by the central bank, even  if 
there  are rational  expectations  that the  exchange  rate will  continue  to 
depreciate  at some  point in the future. 
3.  Why  Do the Short-Term  Output  Losses  Tend  to Be Less 
Under  ERBS  than  MBS? 
The basic  point  has  to do  with  remonetization  of the  conomy,  a point 
stressed  by Mundell  in the 1960s. Suppose  that money  demand  is given 
by the standard relationship  M/P =  m(i), where  i is the nominal interest 
rate. In turn, write i as r +  e, where  Tr'  is expected  inflation and r is the 
real  interest  rate.  When  disinflation  comes  (even  if  it  is  temporary), 
expected  inflation  drops.  For a given  real interest rate, the demand  for 
real-money  balances increases.  In an ERBS, the money  supply  increases 
automatically  as  domestic  wealth  holders  convert  their  foreign  assets 
and mattress dollars back into domestic  currency. The central bank inter- 
venes  to  peg  the  exchange  rate,  buying  dollars  and  selling  domestic 
money,  thereby raising MIP. 
In  an  MBS,  by  contrast,  the  central  bank  does  not  intervene.  The 
nominal  money  supply  remains  unchanged  (assuming,  as is generally 
the  rule  in  MBS,  no  domestic  credit  expansion  in  place  of  exchange- 
market  intervention).  The  only  way  for  real-money  balances  to  rise, 
therefore,  is for the absolute  price level to decline.  If domestic  prices are 
sticky downward  for some  reason (e.g.  contracts, public-sector pricing), 
the result  is that M/P can't increase  sufficiently.  As result,  the fall in I 
must  be  matched  by a compensating  rise in r, the real interest  rate, in 
order to keep  the money  market in equilibrium.  The rise in real interest 
rates, in turn, reduces  real output. 
4.  Why  do  Many  ERBS  Episodes  Begin  with  a Boom? 
This  is  the  question  skillfully  addressed  in  Rebelo  and  Vegh's  paper. 
Even  if the  relative  efficiency  of ERBS relative to MBS is clear, for rea- 
sons  just  given,  it  is  still a mystery  why  ERBS actually  starts with  a 
boom  rather  than  a  mild  contraction.  The  authors  test  several  well- 
known  hypotheses,  such as inflation inertia (which  can produce  low  or 
negative  real interest  rates at the start of disinflation),  lack of credibility Comment 183 
(which  can cause  consumers  to tilt their consumption  to the temporary 
period of low inflation),  or simply the efficiency gains from low inflation 
(which  lead to a consumption  and investment  boom).  Interestingly,  de- 
spite  their best  hopes,  the inflation-inertia  explanation,  combined  with 
supply-side  gains  of disinflation,  proves  to be most compatible with the 
evidence  (as processed  by the simulation exercises),  whereas  the alterna- 
tive explanations  seem  wanting  in one  way  or another.  The temporari- 
ness  hypothesis  does  not  fare well,  which  is not  surprising,  since  the 
boom  has  followed  ERBS programs  of  varying  degrees  of  credibility, 
without  being  linked  in an obvious  way  to the underlying  credibility of 
the disinflation  program. 
I think that the authors  miss  an important,  and as yet poorly under- 
stood,  link in  the  puzzle.  As  discussed  earlier, disinflation  produces  a 
rise in real money  holdings.  In a fractional banking system,  the rise in MI 
P is associated  with a sharp rise in bank lending.  Most developing  coun- 
tries have repressed financial markets, in which certain classes of custom- 
ers can borrow  only  from certain classes  of financial institutions.  When 
the banks  are illiquid as a result of low  levels  of domestic  money  hold- 
ing,  bank  borrowers  (such  as  consumers  seeking  consumer  credit  or 
home  builders)  are unable  to get the credits that they desire from other 
sources.  In this  way,  high  inflation  squeezes  many  groups  out  of  the 
credit market,  by  causing  a low  level  of intermediation  in the banking 
system.  Conversely,  stabilization  leads  to  a sharp  increase  of banking 
intermediation  and  a boom  in credits  to previously  rationed  agents  in 
the  economy.  Thus,  ERBS has  often  been  accompanied  by  a boom  in 
bank lending,  which  in turn has fueled  a boom  in consumption  spend- 
ing  and  household  investment  spending.  I think that the authors  miss 
this  link by  the  underyling  assumption  of perfect  capital markets  and 
single  interest  rate against which  intertemporally  optimizing  agents  can 
borrow subject only to a long-term  solvency  constraint. 
5.  Why  Is the ERBS  Boom  Sometimes  Followed  by a Bust? 
The counterpart bust to the initial boom is even more puzzling.  Many of 
the theories  of the boom  would  not really predict a subsequent  interval 
of  recession.  And  yet,  several  episodes  of  early boom  were  then  fol- 
lowed  by bust.  Here,  it seems  that a combination  of nominal  rigidities 
and the banking  credit cycle both play a role. The authors find,  to their 
obvious  consternation,  that the assumption  of inflation inertia helps  to 
account  for the  empirical experiences,  since exchange-rate  stabilization 
is followed  by an overvaluation  of the real exchange rate, which is subse- 
quently  resolved  by a recession. 184- SACHS 
Obviously,  inflation  inertia  seems  to  run  counter  to  pure,  full- 
information,  optimizing  models.  Yet there  are some  obvious,  observ- 
able  factors  causing  inflation  inertia.  In practice,  the  inertia  is  in  the 
nontradables  sector, for which  the dollar-based pricing discussed  earlier 
(in  Section  2)  does  not  apply  as  directly.  The  rigidities  are  often  in 
public-sector  services,  such  as utilities  fees  and  transport costs,  which 
the government  continues  to raise gradually after stabilization in order 
to recoup  previous  declines  in real public-sector  prices.  Also,  in Chile 
and  other  countries,  legally  mandated  wage  indexation  caused  inertia 
in wage  inflation,  which  translated  into  inertia in nontradables  prices. 
Banking  credit also  probably  plays  a role in  the  subsequent  bust.  If 
ERBS instigates  a boom  in banking  credit, the banks eventually  become 
fully  loaned  up  (e.g.,  relative  to prudential  standards  on  bank capital 
adequacy).  After  rapid  lending,  the  banks  stop  further  extensions  of 
credit, leading  to a rapid cutback in consumer lending,  causing the initial 
boom  to tilt over into a subsequent  recession.  Since the banking  side of 
the story has not yet been  investigated  properly, this causation is still to 
be verified,  but it seems  to be consistent  with the large number of ERBS 
epsiodes  that end  with  a banking  crisis, after a rapid overexpansion  of 
bank credit in the immediate  aftermath of stabilization. 
6. What  to Do? 
The bottom-line  question  then is how to enjoy stabilization at low cost to 
output,  while  at the same  time avoiding  the boom-bust  cycle.  It seems 
increasingly  clear that the right approach is a two-step  approach, of early 
exchange-rate  pegging,  in order to "import" low  dollar inflation and to 
remonetize  the economy, followed  by a move to a more flexible exchange- 
rate system  after low  inflation  has been  achieved,  in order to avoid the 
problems  of creeping  overvaluation.  It seems,  for example,  that Mexico 
achieved low-cost  disinflation at the end of the 1980s, but then succumbed 
to subsequent  bust in 1994-1995,  as a result of several years of growing 
real overvaluation,  followed  by a foreign borrowing  crisis and a related 
banking  crisis (see Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 1995). 
I should  stress  that there is probably another reason to favor an early 
peg  of the  exchange  rate, in addition  to remonetization.  When  econo- 
mies are highly  demonetized,  they may become  subject to self-fulfilling 
flights  from the currency. In a self-fulfilling  currency panic,  agents  flee 
the domestic  currency out of fear of high inflation.  The currency flight, 
in turn,  causes  the inflation  that was  feared. Pegging  the exchange  rate 
can  be  a way  to  stop  a self-fulfilling  hyperinflation.  (See  Sachs,  1995, 
for a detailed  discussion.) Discussion  185 
Still,  moving  from  an  initially  pegged  rate to a flexible  rate (e.g.,  a 
crawling  band)  is easier  said than done.  We still don't  have  an agreed 
approach  to announcing,  at the start of stabilization,  that a peg  will be 
temporary, to be followed  by some  sort of band or float. The experiences 
of Israel and  Poland,  which  both  had  ERBS followed  by  more  flexible 
arrangements,  could provide  valuable lessons. 
At the same time, there are several other important questions.  Should 
the monetary  authorities  use  short-term capital controls to limit the rate 
of remonetization  of the  economy,  perhaps  thereby  avoiding  a boom- 
bust cycle? It seems  that Chile may have been somewhat  effective in this 
regard.  Should  the  banking  system  be more tightly  regulated  to avoid 
the  boom-bust  cycle?  This  seems  especially  relevant  in  that  banking 
deregulation,  by  itself,  has  often  contributed  to a boom-bust  cycle  of 
bank  lending  (cf.  the  U.S.  savings-and-loan  crisis,  the  Scandinavian 
banking crises following  banking liberalization, and the Japanese bubble 
of the  late  1980s, followed  by bust in the  1990s). It seems  that there is 
also  a case  for  developing  countries  to  resist  the  introduction  of  dol- 
larized accounts  (either indexed  accounts  or foreign-currency  accounts) 
in  the  domestic  banking  system:  such  accounts  invite  panicky  deposit 
movements  between  the  domestic  currency  and  the  foreign  currency, 
since  the  central  bank  cannot  effectively  be  the  lender  of  last  resort 
against  foreign-currency  accounts.  Finally, there is a need  to investigate 
more  deeply  the  option  to  combine  ERBS with  a currency-board  ap- 
proach  to domestic  monetary  management.  On the plus  side,  the  cur- 
rency board helps  to limit abuses of excess domestic credit expansion; on 
the  minus  side,  the  currency  board  rules  out  the  lender-of-last-resort 
function  of the central bank, and thereby may permit the onset  of bank- 
ing panics in fragile circumstances. 
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countries.  For the case of hyperinflation,  as in Bolivia a decade ago or in 
many countries  following  the two world wars, it is possible  to argue that 
at the  time  when  a stabilization  is implemented  the  economy  is  com- 
pletely  out of steady  state. Therefore, in countries with hyperinflation  it 
is relatively easy to explain why  stabilization raises output.  However,  in 
chronic-inflation  countries  (i.e.,  countries  with  persistent  inflation  of 
about 40-100% per year), the economies  develop  extensive  indexation in 
all markets.  In these  countries  it is much more difficult to argue that the 
real effects that are observed  after stabilization are just the recovery from 
a deep prestabilization  recession.  This difference between  hyperinflation 
and  chronic-inflation  countries  explains  why  the paper focuses  on  dy- 
namics  around  the steady  state. 
To address  Baxter's criticisms that the model  is too simple,  Vegh  said 
that they  had  begun  with  a much  larger and  more  complicated  set  of 
model  variants.  More complicated  models  are indeed  often more realis- 
tic,  but  when  the  complexity  becomes  too  great,  it is  difficult  for the 
researcher  to  understand  intuitively  what  is  generating  the  results. 
Hence  the  authors  decided  in  favor of  a simpler  model  which  would 
allow  them  to study  four or five basic effects  and to discriminate  more 
sharply among  a few alternative hypotheses. 
On  the  role  of fiscal effects  brought  up  by  Sachs,  Vegh  agreed  that 
fiscal changes  are an integral part of a successful  stabilization program. 
The puzzle  is that a money-based  stabilization is typically followed  by a 
recession,  and  an exchange-rate-based  stabilization  is usually  followed 
by a boom,  even  though  the fiscal adjustment  is often similar in the two 
cases.  Why  this  happens  needs  to be  clarified before  progress  can be 
made  on  the  role  of  fiscal  factors  in  the  stabilization.  In response  to 
Vegh's  comments,  Andres Velasco asked how the authors would  explain 
the  tendency  for real appreciation,  increases  in real estate  prices,  and 
other  real effects  to  occur in  both  successful  and  failed  stabilizations, 
while  most  of  the  failed  stabilizations  had  little  in  the  way  of  fiscal 
adjustment.  Velasco  ruled  out  as implausible  an explanation  based  on 
the assumption  that people  expected  fiscal adjustment in the failed stabi- 
lizations but the government  did not deliver. Rebelo answered  that fiscal 
adjustment  could  not  explain  everything  in every  stabilization; all epi- 
sodes  mix many factors, and it is an open  question  whether  fiscal effects 
are central.  Martin Feldstein  pointed  out that at least part of observed 
fiscal  adjustments  following  stabilizations  are endogenous,  as  a slow- 
down  in inflation  automatically  produces  an increase in taxes relative to 
real GDP through  the Oliveira-Tanzi  effect. 
Bob Gordon  asked  what  a country  implementing  a stabilization  pro- 
gram  should  do  to  avoid  a serious  overvaluation  of  the  currency. He Discussion  *  187 
pointed  to the case of Mexico,  where  the steady appreciation  of the real 
exchange  rate after the  stabilization  had set the stage  for the crisis and 
the  devaluation.  In particular, since  most  of  the  Mexican  appreciation 
was  due  to capital inflows,  Gordon asked whether  stabilizing countries 
should  attempt to sterilize these inflows.  Vegh agreed that the tendency 
of the real exchange  rate to appreciate following  an exchange-rate-based 
stabilization  was well  established,  as was a consequent  tendency  for the 
current account to go into deficit. These outcomes  are perhaps unavoid- 
able during  the elimination  of a chronic inflation.  The question  is, what 
is the  optimal  policy  after three years-should  the monetary  authority 
abandon  the nominal  anchor and devalue?  Although  some  economists 
argue in favor of devaluation,  Vegh  stressed  that the right policy is not 
obvious.  One consideration  is the nature of the initial commitment  to the 
fixed exchange  rate: If the stabilization is implemented  through a convert- 
ibility plan or a currency board, for example,  devaluation  carries the cost 
of a huge  loss  of  credibility. In cases  where  the  government  does  not 
commit itself "irrevocably" to a fixed exchange rate (e.g.,  Israel), it might 
be  best  to  devalue  once  or even  several  times  during  the  life  of  the 
program. 
Feldstein  asked  how  a  government  could  implement  an  exchange- 
rate-based stabilization without  a credible promise of monetary stabiliza- 
tion as well.  Does  an external source of foreign exchange,  for example, 
provide  additional  credibility to the program? Sachs noted  that as long 
as the monetary  authorities  have  some  international  reserves,  they  can 
start an exchange-rate-based  stabilization.  Even if everybody  (rationally) 
anticipates  that reserves  are not going to last for very long,  the plan does 
not  collapse  instantaneously;  indeed,  there may be an initial capital in- 
flow  as investors  try to take advantage  of the high  interest  rates in the 
period  before  the  speculative  attack. Further, as a result  of the  capital 
inflow,  the banks become  liquid and spending  goes up. Ironically, Sachs 
remarked, as remonetization  proceeds,  the first intervention  the govern- 
ment  needs  to perform  is a monetary  easing,  to prevent  excessive  real 
appreciation  of the currency. Feldstein asked whether  the exchange-rate- 
based  stabilization  should  not be considered  as the front end  of a pro- 
gram  that  will  also  eventually  include  monetary  adjustment.  Sachs 
agreed that monetary  adjustment  had to take place at some point; but he 
noted  that the problem  with  the money-based  approach is that it is not 
credible to announce  a target money  path that begins  with a 50% jump, 
as would  be required for remonetization.  Hence,  a money-based  stabili- 
zation  almost  inevitably  leads  to a severe  recession  at the beginning  of 
the program. 